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Burch: "Unfit to Serve" Post-Enron

“UNFIT TO SERVE” POST-ENRON
Regina F. Burch*
I. INTRODUCTION
In what may well be “the biggest case you’ve never heard of[,]”
former senior executives and directors of now-bankrupt National
Century Financial Enterprises, Inc. (“NCFE”) allegedly “defrauded
investors of more than $3 billion.”1 Generally, the alleged fraud involves
facts now too familiar to the public. Prior to its bankruptcy, privately
owned NCFE purchased receivables from healthcare providers to help
those providers “bridge the gap between when they treated patients and
when they received payment from private insurance companies,
Medicare or Medicaid.”2 According to the Securities and Exchange
Commission’s (“SEC”) complaint, NCFE raised money from investors
under the condition that the funds were to be used to purchase eligible
receivables.3 Instead, certain NCFE directors and senior executives used
the cash to make unsecured loans to distressed and failing healthcare
providers owned wholly or partly by NCFE or its executives.4 Then,
NCFE’s management “conspired to conceal cash shortages by shuttling

Associate Professor of Law, Capital University School of Law; A.B., Harvard College,
1986; M.S.A., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 1992;
J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 1999. The author extends
thanks to the faculty and administration at Capital University School of Law for research
support. In addition, I would like to thank Stefan Padfield and participants in the Ohio
Legal Scholarship Workshop and in the Midwest People of Color Legal Scholarship
Conference 2006 Annual Meeting for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts. I also
extend thanks to Tiffany Auvdel, JD ‘07, for her research assistance.
1
Associated Press, Former Loan Firm Execs in $3 Billion Fraud Case (May 23, 2006),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12932980/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2008). The Securities and
Exchange Commission civil complaint alleges that the defendants engaged “in an
extraordinary scheme to defraud investors who eventually lost approximately $2.6 billion.”
SEC v. Poulsen, No. 2:05CV1142, 2005 WL 4051274, at Summary ¶ 1 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 21,
2005).
The complex and contentious bankruptcy case involved “the competing
bankruptcies of over 500 separate medical provider entities in over 2,500 locations, secured
bondholder claims of over $3.5 billion, and a shortfall of over $2.5 billion in assets. The
confirmation hearing was equally complex and contentious.” Jones Day, Experience Details,
http://www.jonesday.com/experience/experience_detail.aspx?exID=S321 (last visited
Feb. 22, 2008).
2
Associated Press, supra note 1.
3
See Poulsen, 2005 WL 4051274, at Uncollateralized Advances ¶¶ 1-70.
4
Id. at Summary ¶ 2.
*
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money among various subsidiaries[,]” doctoring audit details, and
falsifying books and records.5
In a much smaller accounting and financial fraud case involving
only $19 million, senior executives and directors of publicly-held
Chancellor Corporation (“Chancellor”), a Massachusetts transportation
company, allegedly conspired to inflate revenues on its books by
knowingly and improperly consolidating revenue from a subsidiary over
which the corporation had no control.6 Chancellor accomplished this by
reporting fees paid by Chancellor for services not rendered and
improperly reporting the bogus fees among Chancellor’s assets.7
The differences between the two cases involved not only the scale of
the fraud, but also the role played by the defendants in each. The NCFE
defendants were management directors; that is, they held senior
management employee positions within NCFE.8
Allegedly, they
knowingly participated in the fraud by creating false documents and
making false oral statements to the public or directing other employees
to do so. By contrast, the Chancellor case involved both management
and non-management directors.9
As with NCFE, Chancellor’s
management directors knowingly participated in the alleged fraud.
However, according to the complaint, Chancellor’s non-management
directors were culpable because they turned a blind eye to the fraud and
did nothing to prevent or stop the management directors’ fraudulent
conduct. In both cases, the SEC sought to bar the defendants from
serving as officers and directors of any company whose securities are
registered pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”) and

Associated Press, supra note 1. See also Poulsen, 2005 WL 4051274, at Misleading
Agreed-Upon Procedures Reports ¶ 148, Defendant Poulsen’s Participation in the Scheme
to Defraud ¶¶ 154, 158; Jones Day, supra note 1.
6
SEC v. Chancellor Corp., No. 1:03-CV-10762, 2003 WL 23885225, at ¶¶ 1-8 (D. Mass.
Apr. 24, 2003).
7
Id.
8
See Poulsen, 2005 WL 4051274, at ¶¶ 7-10.
9
Chancellor Corp., 2003 WL 23885225, at ¶¶ 12-21. This Article borrows the term “[n]on[m]anagement [d]irector” from a recent article by Donald C. Clarke describing how courts
and commentators use different terminology, such as “independent,” “disinterested[,]”
“non-executive,” and “non-employee,” to distinguish between inside and outside directors.
See Donald C. Clarke, Three Concepts of the Independent Director, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 73, 78-79
(2007). Non-management directors do not hold executive positions within the corporation.
Id. at 79. Non-management directors are often senior executives at other corporations,
public sector employees who are influential in political circles, in some other way
influential in the corporation’s business, well-regarded academics, or former or current
counsel to the corporation. Id.
5
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the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), among other
remedies.10
Section 305(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOA”) authorized
the SEC to bar:
any person who violated section 10(b) [of the Securities
Exchange Act] or the rules or regulations thereunder
from acting as an officer or director of any issuer [of a
publicly-traded or registered security] . . . if the person’s
conduct demonstrates unfitness to serve as an officer or
director of any such issuer.11

10
See Chancellor Corp., 2003 WL 23885225, at Prayer for Relief; Poulsen, 2005 WL 4051274,
at Prayer for Relief. See generally Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2000);
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78nn (2000).
11
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21(d)(2), 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u(d)(2) (2000)). In addition to providing for bar orders on a showing of unfitness under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 [hereinafter “Exchange Act”], the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 also authorized the SEC to prohibit an individual from serving
as an officer and director if the person violates the Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 17(a)(1),
48 Stat. 74 [hereinafter “Securities Act”], the provision prohibiting fraud in the offer or sale
of securities, or its rules and regulations. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 1105(b), P.L. 107204, 116 Stat. 745, 780 (2002) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1(f) (2000)). The SEC
now can issue these orders in an administrative proceeding on a showing of unfitness, in
contrast to the earlier standard, substantial unfitness. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2) (2000).
Courts have used Professor Jayne Barnard’s suggested factors to determine whether an
executive should be barred because the executive is substantially unfit to serve. See, e.g.,
SEC v. Shah, No. 92-CIV 1952, 1993 WL 288285, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 1993) (discussing
and applying Professor Barnard’s factors, including: “(1) the ‘egregiousness’ of the
underlying securities law violation; (2) the defendant’s ‘repeat offender’ status; (3) the
defendant’s ‘role’ or position when he engaged in the fraud; (4) the defendant’s degree of
scienter; (5) the defendant’s economic stake in the violation; and (6) the likelihood that
misconduct will recur”); SEC v. Patel, 61 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Jayne W. Barnard,
When is a Corporate Executive “Substantially Unfit to Serve?”, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1489, 1510-22
(1992) (proposing a factor test used by federal courts to determine whether a bar order is an
appropriate remedy); Jayne W. Barnard, The SEC’s Suspension and Bar Powers in Perspective,
76 TUL. L. REV. 1253, 1259 (2002) (describing courts’ use of her proposed factors). Although
the standard under SOA has changed from “substantial unfitness” to “unfitness,” courts
have continued to use the tests developed under the previous standard. Stephen J.
Crimmins, Where are We Going with SEC Officer and Director Bars?, 38 SEC. REG. & L. REP.
717, 718 (2006). However, these tests may result in liability in under more limited
circumstances than Congress intended. See infra Section V.D; see also Thomas O. Gorman &
Heather J.Stewart, Is There a New Sheriff in Corporateville? The Obligations of Directors,
Officers, Accountants, and Lawyers After Sarbanes-Oxley, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 135, 148 (2004).
But see Jayne W. Barnard, SEC Debarment of Officers and Directors After Sarbanes-Oxley, 59
BUS. LAW. 391, 414-17 (2004) (describing the “[i]nherent [i]llegitimacy of a [l]ifetime [b]ar
[o]rder.”).
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This Article proposes that both management and non-management
directors who knowingly or recklessly engage in accounting and
financial fraud are unfit to serve and should be barred from serving as
officers and directors of publicly traded corporations. Moreover,
directors who knowingly or recklessly fail to halt or disclose accounting
fraud and similar unlawful behavior should be temporarily or
permanently barred from serving as officers or directors of public
corporations. In particular, this article proposes that non-management
directors’ reckless failures to respond to red flags may amount to an
intentional omission of material information and violate the Securities
Exchange Act, Section 10(b), among other federal laws.12
It may be well accepted that willful accounting fraud violates
specific provisions of the federal securities laws. Also, it may not be
controversial that executives who fail to respond to red flags indicating
accounting fraud may be found to have violated the federal securities
laws. More controversial is that such executives—both management and
non-management directors—may be found unfit to serve as officers and
directors of public corporations and may be permanently barred from
service.
Accounting fraud may be the most pervasive type of fraud infecting
modern corporations. As demonstrated by NCFE and Chancellor, such
schemes may be facilitated by management directors and senior
executives who know how to hide fraud within the camouflage of
legitimate transactions, by non-management directors who fail to
investigate obvious red flags, by ineffective internal control systems, and
by accountants, lawyers, bankers, and analysts who are captured by their
See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000). Under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, it is unlawful:
To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security
not so registered . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
Id. Likewise, Rule 10b-5 prohibits:
[the] [e]mployment of manipulative and deceptive devices. . . . (a)
To . . . defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or
to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or
course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or
deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007).
12
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clients.13 Executives who know of accounting fraud and take no steps to
prevent the fraud may be liable for violating fiduciary duties as set forth
in state corporation statutes or for violating disclosure requirements as
set forth in federal securities law.14 However, executives who recklessly
ignore signs of accounting fraud may not be liable under state or federal
law unless it can be shown that those executives should have known of
the red flags and that their failure to know demonstrates an egregious
lapse of care under state law standards or violates antifraud provisions
under federal securities law.
It has been very difficult under both federal securities laws and state
laws to hold executives responsible for accounting fraud or for aiding
and abetting such fraud, although recent successes have been achieved.
Federal criminal trials for violations of federal securities laws are
lengthy, involve large resource expenditures by government prosecutors,
require sifting through thousands of pages of corporate documents, and
involve many corporate employees and other individuals. The U.S.
Department of Justice (“DOJ”), which has exclusive authority over
criminal enforcement of federal securities laws, must show that the
defendant acted willfully or knowingly and must establish its case by
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.15 Under these circumstances, “it is
invariably very difficult to assign individual fault.”16
Also, private plaintiffs’ ability to enforce federal securities laws in
state court is constrained by federal legislation—including the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”),17 the Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (“SLUSA”),18 and the National
Capture occurs when third party gatekeepers self-identify with issuers and
management and are thus unable to render an unbiased opinion regarding the truthfulness
and fairness of such issuer’s financial statements.
14
See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 750 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, 906
A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) (finding that liability may result from egregious lapses in duty to
monitor). See infra Part IV for the proposition that non-management directors may be
liable under federal law.
15
See Geraldine Szott Moohr, An Enron Lesson: The Modest Role of Criminal Law in
Preventing Corporate Crime, 55 FLA. L. REV. 937 (2003) (discussing recent Department of
Justice successes in criminal enforcement actions).
16
Dale A. Oesterle, Early Observations on the Prosecutions of the Business Scandals of 200203: On Sideshow Prosecutions, Spitzer’s Clash with Donaldson over Turf, The Choice of Civil or
Criminal Actions, and the Tough Tactic of Coerced Cooperation, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 443, 446
(2004).
17
15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1, 77z-2, 78j-1, 78u-4, 78u-5 (2000).
18
15 U.S.C. § 78a (2000); see Pub. L. No. 105-353, Tit. 1, § 101(a)(1), 112 Stat. 3227 (1998);
Securities Act § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b) (2000); Exchange Act § 28(f)(1), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78bb(f)(1) (Supp. 2002).
13
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Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996 (“NSMIA”)19—each passed
during the Clinton administration.20 Private plaintiffs in state court also
face difficulty as a result of procedural and substantive hurdles,
including the business judgment rule and the derivative lawsuit demand
requirement, combined with protections afforded by directors’ and
officers’ liability insurance.21 State Attorneys General confront many of
the same problems in proving the fraud as those faced by federal
prosecutors. Moreover, resource constraints may affect state attorneys
even more severely than federal attorneys.
Also, the SEC—which has
the power to adopt rules to implement the federal securities laws, to
bring and to judge administrative proceedings against violators of such
rules, and to initiate enforcement actions in federal court—has
traditionally had limited options for prosecuting fraudulent financial
reporting.22 More recently, Congress provided the SEC with additional
resources and additional enforcement tools in the SOA.
Most
significantly, Congress gave the SEC the power to permanently bar
persons from serving as officers or directors of publicly-traded
corporations in administrative proceedings or to seek a court-ordered
bar upon a showing of unfitness.23

15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-3, 78mm, 80b-3a. (2000).
The PSLRA, specifically, was enacted by a substantial, bipartisan Congressional vote
over President Clinton’s veto.
21
See Bernard Black et al., Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1074-76 (2006);
Hillary A. Sale, Independent Directors as Securities Monitors, 61 BUS. LAW. 1375, 1388 (2006)
(describing reasons why independent director liability in private plaintiff lawsuits is rare).
22
See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomson, SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical
Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 737, 747 (2003). Before the 1990 legislation, the SEC’s options for
prosecuting such violations were extremely limited: the SEC could initiate an injunctive
action in federal court. See 104 Stat. at 931 (enacted “[t]o amend the Federal securities laws
in order to provide additional enforcement remedies for violations of those laws”). If the
misleading item appeared in a report required to be filed with the SEC, the SEC could
bring an administrative action under Section 15(c)(4) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o(c)(4). However, the 15(c)(4) administrative remedy arguably was limited to requiring
the registrant to correct its filing. A somewhat more sweeping administrative sanction
existed under the Securities Act in the form of a stop order or refusal order when a
registration statement filed with the SEC was believed to be materially misleading. More
frequently, the SEC resorted to negotiations with the offending parties that culminated in a
settlement embodied in a report of the results of its investigation as authorized by Section
21(a) of the Exchange Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (2000) (authorizing the SEC to make
investigations into possible violations and to publish its findings).
23
Previously, the SEC could seek a bar only upon a showing of substantial unfitness and
only in a federal district court proceeding. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
19
20
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This Article argues that the SEC should vigorously pursue fraud
actions against corporate directors who fall “asleep at the switch[.]”24
Moreover, the SEC should forcefully exercise its regulatory authority to
find such directors unfit and permanently bar these directors from
service. Enforcement actions of this type may be one means to deter the
accounting and financial fraud of the type exemplified by Enron, Tyco,
WorldCom, and others at the start of this century. Factors that deter
accounting fraud include the fear of getting caught, the likelihood of
getting caught, the belief that the behavior is criminal or illegal, and the
resources available for enforcement against white collar accounting
fraud. While the Securities Act, Exchange Act, and SOA (or for that
matter any combination of legal regulation) alone will not prevent fraud,
many agree that legal regulation—and the actors who enforce the legal
rules, particularly the SEC—combined with market regulation and other
factors that influence behavioral norms, are strong tools to uncover fraud
and enforce fair play in the securities market.
Also, falling asleep at the switch harms corporations, shareholders,
the public at large, and the economy in general.25 Public confidence in
the securities markets reached a low point after the revelation of
accounting and financial frauds at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and more.26
The stock market experienced steep drops, some believe due to the wave
of accounting restatements and consequent loss in investor confidence.
In April, 2007, the market capitalization27 of corporations publicly-traded
on United States stock exchanges accounted for $19.640 trillion, while
total global market capitalization was around $50 trillion.28 In other
words, publicly-traded U.S. corporations made up approximately forty
percent of global market capitalization.29 Investment in the securities of
such corporations accounted for approximately “[forty-five] percent of

24
Otis Bilodeau, SEC to Go After Directors Who Ignore Fraud; Case Against Former Outside
Board Member of Firm Will Be Model, CHI. SUN TIMES, Aug. 21, 2003.
25
Lisa M. Fairfax, Form Over Substance?: Officer Certification and the Promise of Enhanced
Personal Accountability Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 9-10 (2002).
26
Id. at 10.
27
Market capitalization is a measure of how much money is invested in a particular firm
and is based on the number of shares of a firm multiplied by the share price. For example,
a firm with 100 shares total in the hands of its investors, each share worth $10, has a market
capitalization of $1000.
28
WORLD FEDERATION OF EXCHANGES, Domestic Market Capitalization, March 5, 2007,
http://www.world-exchanges.org/WFE/home.asp?menu=406&document=4140
(last
visited Feb. 22, 2008).
29
Forty percent is calculated by dividing U.S. gross domestic product by global gross
domestic product.
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the value of equities traded worldwide.”30 Global gross domestic
product approximated $44 trillion, and United States gross domestic
product accounted for approximately nineteen percent of global gross
domestic product.31 Clearly, the economic health of corporations (and
transparency into the economic condition of corporations) is essential to
smooth functioning of the United States economy, if not the world
economy. “[The] U.S. sneezes and [the] world catches cold[.]”32
Moreover, while directors are not responsible for the details of
corporate operations, they should be responsible for being aware of
those operations to the extent that red flags regarding accounting fraud
are recognized and addressed. Management directors who hold
positions of responsibility within a company may face increased risk of
liability post-SOA, but are not (and should not be) solely responsible for
the activities of the business.33 Management and non-management
directors share corporate monitoring responsibilities. In fact, under
director independence requirements in federal regulation, nonmanagement directors may be expected to diligently monitor
management directors’ activities. SOA does not include an express
remedy if directors fail in their oversight and monitoring duties and as a
result fail to disclose truthful, material information in financial
statements or fail to ensure that such information is disclosed. Instead,
this gap may be filled by the SEC under its power to enforce specific
antifraud provisions in the securities laws.

Glen Yago et al., Home Bias in Global Capital Markets: What is the Potential Demand for
U.S. Asset-Backed Securities?, MILKEN INST. 1 (2006); Rick Newman, Five Reasons Foreign
Money Boosts the U.S. Economy, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 11, 2008, available at
http://www.usnews.com/blogs/flowchart/2008/1/11/five-reasons-foreign-moneyboosts-the-us-economy.html.
31
Global Stock Values Top $50 Trln: Industry Data, REUTERS (London), Mar. 21, 2007,
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL2144839620070321 (last visited Feb. 22, 2008).
32
Michael R. Sesit, Around the Markets: U.S. Sneezes and World Catches Cold, INT’L HERALD
TRIB.,
Sept.
18,
2006,
available
at
http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/09/17/bloomberg/bxatm.php.
See also Sergery
Minaev, The U.S. Economy Sneezes: Dollar Takes a Nosedive, INTELLIBRIEFS, Apr. 16, 2007,
available
at
http://intellibriefs.blogspot.com/2007/04/us-economy-sneezes-dollartakes.html; Michael Chriszt, U.S. Sneezes, World Catches Cold, ECONSOUTH, 2d Qtr. 2001,
available
at
http://www.frbatlanta.org/invoke.cfm?objectid=87B67B00-6666-11D593390020352A7A95&method=display. But see Tony Lopez, When the U.S. Sneezes, the World
Doesn’t
Care,
THE
MANILA
TIMES,
Apr.
17,
2007,
available
at
http://www.manilatimes.net/national/2007/apr/17/yehey/opinion/20070417opi6.html
(listing a number of reasons why the world will not catch a cold, and the Philippines will
not catch pneumonia, from the U.S. economy’s latest sneeze).
33
Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors’ Fiduciary Duty
Through Legal Liability, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 393, 455 (2005).
30
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This Article proceeds as follows. Part II briefly overviews the duty
to monitor defined in state and federal law. Part III discusses
management directors’ fraud, and how and why these directors’ failures
to monitor and to investigate corporate operations may amount to
misrepresentations and omissions of financial information in violation of
Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act. Moreover, it discusses
how management executives may be and have been found unfit to serve
when their conduct meets certain criteria. Further, it discusses the
criteria used to determine whether they should be barred from serving as
officers and directors. Part IV discusses non-management directors’
failure to monitor and whether failure to monitor amounts to a
misrepresentation or omission in violation of Section 10(b). It considers
factors a court should examine to determine whether a non-management
violator should be found unfit to serve and the criteria a court should
consider to determine that a bar order is the appropriate remedy.
Part V considers challenges and policy issues that may arise. First, it
discusses why, although they are unlikely to succeed, opponents may
bring constitutional challenges. Second, the Part discusses the standard
of proof for the underlying violation, the unfitness issue, and whether a
bar order is the appropriate remedy. Third, Part V considers the nature
of the incentives that such SEC action would create. Fourth, the Part
discusses whether the SEC is fit to serve in this role of overseer and
enforcer. Finally, Part V addresses the criticisms that the SEC is unlikely
to fully exercise its powers to bar directors and that the SEC should not
use its administrative powers to create a de facto federal common law
duty of care. The Article concludes in Part VI.
II. THE DUTY TO MONITOR AND INVESTIGATE
A. Duty to Monitor and Investigate Under State Law
The duty of care and the duty of loyalty have been described as the
traditional fiduciary duties owed by directors to the corporation.34 Also,
it is well settled that a director’s duty of care includes the duty to

See William F. Kennedy, The Standard of Responsibility for Directors, 52 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 624, 628 (1985); see also William T. Allen, The Corporate Director’s Fiduciary Duty of Care
and the Business Judgment Rule Under U.S. Corporate Law, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: THE STATE OF THE ART AND EMERGING RESEARCH 307, 315 (Klaus J. Hopt et
al. eds., 1998).
34
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monitor and oversee corporate activities,35 as well as the duty to remain
informed about the corporation,36 the duty to regularly review financial
statements and devote attention to board duties,37 and the duty to
inquire into corporate affairs.38 Aspirational standards of director
conduct traditionally are defined by legally binding case law and
statutes and by non-binding standards of business best practice.39
Two distinct factual situations give rise to the duty to monitor.40 The
first factual scenario involves a board decision regarding a specific
transaction. Directors are expected to employ a reasonable decisionmaking process, i.e., one that was “either deliberately considered in good
faith or [that] was otherwise rational[,]” and to act in the good faith
pursuit of corporate, not personal, interests.41 The second factual
scenario involves circumstances “in which a loss eventuates not from a
decision but[] from unconsidered inaction.”42 For example, the Model
Business Corporation Act, Section 8.30(b), Comment 2, specifies that:
The standard of care associated with the oversight
function involves gaining assurances from management
and advisers that systems believed appropriate have
been established coupled with ongoing monitoring of
the systems in place, such as those concerned with legal
compliance or internal controls—followed up with a
proactive response when alerted to the need for
inquiry.43
Further, “[t]he phrase ‘devoting attention,’ in the context of the oversight
function, refers to concern with the corporation’s information and

35
See Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 822 (N.J. 1981). But see Guttman v.
Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 (Del. Ch. 2003) (stating that the duty to monitor stems from the
duties of care and loyalty).
36
Francis, 432 A.2d at 822; see also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a), cmt. 1 (2005).
37
Francis, 432 A.2d at 822.
38
Id.
39
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 256 (Del. 2000). The exact behavior required of
directors in carefully monitoring and overseeing corporate activities will vary depending
on the circumstances.
40
In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996).
41
Id. (emphasis omitted).
42
Id. at 968.
43
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(b), cmt. 2 (2005).
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reporting systems and not to proactive inquiry searching out system
inadequacies or noncompliance.”44
Three Delaware state court cases provide greater specificity to
behavior required of directors engaged in overseeing general corporate
operations. Two cases, Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.45 and In re
Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation,46 detail a corporate
director’s responsibility to ensure that the appropriate systems indeed
have been established and are providing timely, material information
about the corporation’s business performance and compliance with legal
requirements.
Graham involved a claim that, as early as 1943, Allis-Chalmers
Manufacturing Company directors were aware of Federal Trade
Commission consent decrees and alerted to alleged antitrust violations
within the company. The plaintiffs claimed that the consent decrees put
the directors on notice of alleged illegal activity within the company and
that the directors should have taken steps to learn about ongoing
antitrust violations in the company and prevent future antitrust
violations from occurring in 1956, by which time at least three directors
were aware of the consent decrees against Allis-Chalmers.47 These
directors, after conducting a limited investigation in 1943 and after
consulting with legal counsel, concluded that the company had never
been involved in antitrust violations.48 The Delaware Supreme Court
held that even though the directors knew of the 1937 consent decrees,
and thus had notice of possible illegal activity in 1937, such notice was
not sufficient notice of future illegal activity in 1956.49 More importantly,
the court found that without notice of possible illegal activity, the
directors had no duty to put into place “a system of watchfulness which
would have brought such misconduct to [the board’s] attention in ample
time to have brought it to an end[]” and “no duty . . . to . . . ferret out
wrongdoing which [the board had] no reason to suspect exists.”50
Recently, Graham was interpreted to hold that liability for a breach of
the duty to monitor should be imposed only when the directors had

44
Id. Twenty-nine states have adopted the MBCA in whole or in part. Id. at xix. A
significant number of additional states’ corporate codes are based on the MBCA. Id.
45
188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963).
46
698 A.2d at 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
47
Graham, 188 A.2d at 129.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 130.
50
Id.
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actual or constructive notice of potential wrongdoing within their own
organizations.51 A broader reading of Graham—that directors need not
put in place information gathering and reporting systems regarding the
corporation’s compliance with law—was rejected in Caremark.
In Caremark, plaintiffs claimed that the directors knew uncertainty
existed about the interpretation of the Anti-Referral Payments Law
(“ARPL”), a law prohibiting healthcare providers from paying
“kickbacks” to induce the referral of Medicare or Medicaid patients.
Further, they claimed the directors should have known that certain
Caremark officers and employees were violating the ARPL, that the
directors failed to stop the illegal activities, and that the directors thus
breached their fiduciary duty to pay attention and “to be active monitors
of corporate performance.”52 Essentially, the plaintiffs claimed that the
directors failed to have effective information gathering and reporting
systems in place.53 The Chancery Court interpreted Graham “as standing
for the proposition that, absent grounds to suspect deception, neither
corporate boards nor senior officers can be charged with wrongdoing
simply for assuming the integrity of employees and the honesty of their
dealings on the company’s behalf.”54 Also, the court opined that
corporate boards should:
assur[e] themselves that information and reporting
systems exist in the organization that are reasonably
designed to provide to senior management and to the
51
In re Abbott Labs. Derivative S’holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795, 809 (7th Cir. 2003); McCall
v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808, 818 (6th Cir. 2001); In re Baxter Int’l S’holers Litig., 654 A.2d 1268,
1270-71 (Del. Ch. 1995); In re Illinois Valley Acceptance Corp., 531 F. Supp. 737, 741 (C.D.
Ill. 1982).
52
In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d at 967 (Del. Ch. 1996).
53
See generally id. The essence of a Caremark claim is that directors breached their duty
of care by failing to put in place effective information and reporting systems. In contrast,
the basis of a Graham claim is that the breach of duty arose from the failure to take
appropriate action to respond to red flags signaling obvious wrongdoing in the
corporation. Some courts take the view that failure to respond to known red flags rises to
the level of a sustained and systematic failure to exercise oversight, and states a claim
under Caremark. For example, in Abbott Labs, the plaintiffs alleged a failure by the directors
to take action in light of the red flags generated by internal controls and external sources.
Abbott Labs, 325 F.3d at 802 (7th Cir. 2003); see also Scott, 239 F.3d at 816 (where plaintiffs
claimed that the corporation’s internal audit staff informed the Board’s Audit Committee
about red flags); Benjamin v. Kim, No. 95 Civ. 9597 (LMM), 1999 WL 249706, at *8 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 28, 1999) (in which a sole shareholder and co-CEO of the company informed directordefendant of the existence of several serious red flags); Eric Landau, Shawn Harpen &
Kristel A. Massey, Revisiting Caremark and a Director’s Duty to Monitor: The Chancery Court’s
Wake-up Call to Directors, 1418 PLI/CORP 37, 52 (2004).
54
Caremark, 698 A.2d at 969.
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board itself timely, accurate information sufficient to
allow management and the board, each within its scope,
to reach informed judgments concerning both the
corporation’s compliance with law and its business
performance.55
The Caremark board, in good faith, had implemented internal controls;
the fault lay with employees who lacked integrity.
After Graham and Caremark, a director’s duty to exercise appropriate
attention includes a duty to oversee the implementation of reasonable
information and reporting systems and to inquire into red flags.56 A
more recent case, Beam ex. rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc.,
further defines the duty to monitor, holding that the duty does not create
a requirement for corporate boards to monitor directors’ personal
affairs.57
In order to state a claim for breach of oversight, the plaintiff must
allege facts that show:
(1) that the directors knew or (2) should have known
that violations of law were occurring and, in either
event, (3) that the directors took no steps in a good faith
effort to prevent or remedy that situation, and (4) that
such failure proximately resulted in the losses
complained of . . . .58
If plaintiffs prove that directors became aware of red flags generated by
the internal controls or otherwise and took no action, then liability
should follow.59 However, in the absence of adequate proof of red flags
known to the board, plaintiffs must show “a sustained or systematic

55
Id. at 970. The design and implementation of internal controls and information
systems is within the board’s business discretion.
56
Salsitz v. Nasser, 208 F.R.D. 589, 592 (E.D. Mich. 2002); In re Citigroup Inc. S’holders
Litig., No. 19827, 2003 WL 21384599, at *2 (Del. Ch. June 5, 2003).
57
Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 833 A.2d 961, 975-76
(Del. Ch. 2003), aff’d, 845 A.2d 1040 (Del. 2004).
58
Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971; see also Stewart, 833 A.2d at 976 (quoting Caremark, 698 A.2d
at 971); Canadian Commercial Workers Indus. Pension Plan v. Alden, 2006 WL 456786, at
*6 (Del. Ch. Feb. 22, 2006).
59
Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 129 (Del. 1963); see also Caremark,
698 A.2d at 970.
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failure of the board to exercise oversight . . . .”60 For example, evidence
demonstrating:
an utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable
information and reporting system exits [sic] []will
establish the lack of good faith that is a necessary
condition to liability. Such a test of liability—lack of
good faith as evidenced by sustained or systematic
failure of a director to exercise reasonable oversight—is
quite high.61
Caremark duties implicate the duty of loyalty (and good faith, either
subsumed within the duty of loyalty or as a separate duty) as well as the
duty of care. In Guttman v. Huang, the Chancery Court stated:
Although the Caremark decision is rightly seen as a prod
towards the greater exercise of care by directors in
monitoring their corporations’ compliance with legal
standards, by its plain and intentional terms, the opinion
articulates a standard for liability for failures of
oversight that requires a showing that the directors
breached their duty of loyalty by failing to attend to
their duties in good faith.62
Therefore, Caremark claims are not precluded by the Delaware General
Corporations Code, Section 102(b)(7)’s exculpatory charter provisions.
Generally, Section 102(b)(7) charter provisions—and similar provisions
authorized under other state statutes—may be adopted by corporations
to relieve directors of personal liability for breaches of due care. The
provisions do not relieve directors of liability for breaches of the duty of
loyalty nor for acts not in good faith.63
Cases in which directors were found to have breached their
oversight and monitoring duties are few and far between.64 First, the
presence of internal monitoring and control systems may be evidence
that directors have not systematically and utterly failed to monitor

Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971.
Id.
62
823 A.2d 492, 506 (Del. Ch. 2003).
63
Alden, 2006 WL 456786, at *6 (“[I]f the Amended Complaint adequately states a
Caremark claim, the stated claim necessarily falls outside the liability waiver provided by
[the corporation’s] 102(b)(7) exculpatory charter provision.”).
64
See Fairfax, supra note 33, at 408-14.
60
61
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corporate activities. Second, the fact that directors were unaware of red
flags, despite the existence of internal monitoring and control systems,
simply may be evidence of the lack of integrity of certain employees who
engaged in illegal activities and the deftness with which those employees
hid their illegal activities. Unawareness of red flags, in and of itself, may
not create a reasonable inference that directors consciously abdicated
their monitoring duties or that the systems were not reasonably designed
to provide timely information to the board. Third, directors, with the
possible exception of the chief executive officer and the chief financial
officer, have no state law duty to inquire into the day-to-day operations
of the corporation and no duty to investigate whether internal controls
are effective at an operational level, so long as the internal controls are in
place and directors are not put on notice that the internal controls are not
working.65
While Caremark provides an incentive for corporations to implement
internal controls and allows for the fact that there are an infinite number
of flags that directors might look into, one drawback to the Caremark test
is that it provides no incentive for directors to probe and ask questions.66
Consequently, unreported illegal behavior remains unreported, and
corporations may develop a “don’t ask, don’t tell[]” culture.67
In sum, egregious lapses in oversight—either through conscious
disregard of red flags or ongoing inattention to internal controls, red
flags, and information generated by the controls—may lead to liability.
“[D]irectors cannot ignore red flags generated by internal control
systems if those red flags are numerous, serious, directly in front of the
directors, and indicative of a corporate-wide problem.”68
B. Duty to Monitor and Investigate Under Federal Law
Some scholars see a recent Delaware Supreme Court case as
revealing that even in this post-Enron era of heightened liability under
securities laws and higher federalized standards of corporate governance
under SOA, there is no change in a director’s liability in state court for

65
See Lois F. Herzeca & Angelique Mamby, Evolving Standards for Director Reliance, 7 No.
8 THE M&A LAWYER 18, 18 (Feb. 2004); see also Regina F. Burch, Director Oversight and
Monitoring: The Standard of Care and the Standard of Liability Post-Enron, 6 WYO. L. REV. 481,
498 (2006).
66
Burch, supra note 65, at 502.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 498.
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failure to implement corporate governance best practices.69 Federal law
may define standards of care to some degree; however, the fiduciary
duty and standards governing board behavior mostly have been—and
remain—areas reserved to state law. For example, SOA appears to
model federal law based on Caremark, although explicit monitoring
responsibilities are more limited under federal law than under state law.
SOA Section 302, for instance, requires that the audit committee establish
internal complaint systems, designed to “alert the audit committee to
potential problems before they have serious consequences.”70 Also, it
appears that audit committees bear the responsibility for initiating and
following through on investigations and that such investigations must
come from the top-down instead of from the bottom-up.71
Further, the rules promulgated under SOA define the tests to
determine if internal controls are operating effectively.72 While the
design of internal controls is still within the board’s discretion, the
internal controls must be able to identify “significant deficiencies” and
“material weaknesses”73 and the controls themselves must be tested to
determine if they operate as required.74 In addition, SOA Section 302
places the responsibility for establishing and maintaining internal
controls and ensuring that the internal controls effectively provide
material financial and accounting information to corporate management
squarely on the principal executive and financial officers of the
corporation.75 The chief executive officer and chief financial officer must

69
In a recent interview for the Corporate Accountability Report, Ottilie L. Jarmel
expressed the widespread view that Chancellor William B. Chandler’s decision in Walt
Disney indicates directors will not be liable for breach of fiduciary duty for failing to
integrate corporate best practices into decision-making. BNA CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY
REP., vol. 3, No. 38, at 945 (Sept. 30, 2005) (“[F]iduciary duties don’t change, even when
aspirational best practices do[] . . . .”). I take the view that there will be increased focus on
board actions as federal reforms redefine industry standards for good corporate behavior.
See Burch, supra note 65, at 502-03 (asserting that federal reforms will redefine industry
standards that influence the standard of care applied by state courts in breach of due care
cases). Although securities law claims by state prosecutors recently have had a measure of
success, these enforcement actions are relatively new. Spitzer may be the most notable
example. See Oesterle, supra note 16, at 459-60.
70
Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, Release No. 33-8220, § II(C)
(Apr. 9, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8220.htm; see 15 U.S.C.
§ 7241 (2000).
71
Burch, supra note 65, at 506-07.
72
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 302, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 7241 (Supp. 2003)).
73
Id. at § 302(a)(6).
74
Id. at § 302(a)(4)(C).
75
Id. at § 302(a)(4).
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certify in periodic financial reports to the SEC that the internal controls
are in place and are operating effectively.76 However, the SEC’s release
accompanying the rules that implement Section 302 notes that overall
responsibility for overseeing management’s design and maintenance of
internal controls remains with the corporation’s board of directors. As a
result, SOA may stimulate the questioning that may be missing in a
“don’t ask, don’t tell” environment.
Irrespective of arguments that federal securities disclosure
requirements “create incentives for specific corporate action[]” by, for
example, requiring detailed disclosure of “various corporate systems or
plans[]” or an explanation of why the systems or plans are not in place,
an explicit federal law cause of action for failure to oversee and monitor
does not exist in SOA.77 Furthermore, SOA’s legislative history does not
directly address director oversight and monitoring standards. In SOA,
Congress had the opportunity to go further than it had in the past in
allowing the SEC to set a federal standard of care (simply by seeking
liability against directors for certain actions), either by writing a standard
of care into the statute and then allowing the SEC to enforce it, or by
allowing the SEC to create a standard of care under its rule-making
authority and then enforcing that new standard. While the lack of
Congressional action may be viewed as a deliberate decision not to
intrude on law traditionally relegated to the states, it may also be viewed
as the result of the haste with which Congress enacted SOA. Moreover,
it may be viewed as an implicit satisfaction with, and deference to, the
SEC’s exercise of its adjudicatory powers prior to SOA and to judicial
review of the SEC’s exercise of its powers. If Congress is dissatisfied
with the SEC’s exercise of its enforcement powers post-SOA, then
Congress can amend SOA, even though, prior to SOA, Congress was less
active than the SEC and the courts in this area.
III. BARS AGAINST MANAGEMENT DIRECTORS FOR FAILURE TO MONITOR
AND INVESTIGATE
In order for the SEC to bar directors through an administrative
proceeding or to seek a court-ordered bar for failure to monitor and
oversee corporate operations, three things must happen: (1) the SEC
must prove that failure to monitor and oversee corporate operations
violated Exchange Act Section 10(b) and/or Securities Act Section
17(a)(2); (2) the SEC or a court must determine that the defendant is unfit
76
77

Id. at § 302(a).
Sale, supra note 21, at 1380.
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to serve as an officer or director of a publicly-traded company; and (3)
the SEC or a court must determine whether a temporary or permanent
bar is the appropriate remedy.78
As described above, both management and non-management
directors have a duty to monitor and oversee corporate operations.79
This Part describes typical scenarios in which management directors
were found to be unfit and barred from serving as officers and directors
as well as how their behavior violated Sections 10(b) and 17(a)(2).
Furthermore, this Part discusses the factors the SEC and courts may use
to determine whether the defendants are unfit to serve and to impose a
temporary or permanent bar. Part IV then addresses the circumstances
under which non-management directors might be barred from serving as
officers and directors.
A. Typical Underlying Offenses and Statutes Implicated
To successfully state a civil claim under Rule 10b-5, four elements
must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.80 First, the alleged

78
See SEC v. Shah, No. 92-CIV 1952, 1993 WL 288285, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 1993)
(explaining that a court may impose a bar order on a showing that defendant violated
either Securities Act Section 17(a)(1) or Exchange Act Section 10(b) and that, based on the
defendant’s conduct, the defendant is substantially unfit to serve as an officer or director of
a publicly-traded corporation); see also Jayne W. Barnard, Rule 10b-5 and the Unfitness
Question, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 9, 43-44 (2005) (discussing the three elements in the context of
defining the operative burden of proof); 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000); 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2)
(2000); supra note 12.
79
See supra notes 12-14, 33, and accompanying text; supra Part II and accompanying text.
Some courts and commentators suggest that management directors are subject to a
heightened duty to monitor because they are more familiar with corporate operations. See,
e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 888-89 (Del. 1985) (noting a heightened state lawbased fiduciary duty of care applied to management directors); Feir v. Leasco Data
Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 577-78 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). What constitutes
“reasonable investigation” into the accuracy and completeness of data included in a
registration statement:
will vary with the degree of involvement of the individual [in the
statement’s preparation], his expertise, and his access to the pertinent
information and data . . . Inside directors with intimate knowledge of
corporate affairs and of the particular transactions will be expected to
make a more complete investigation and have more extensive
knowledge of facts supporting or contradicting inclusions in the
registration statements than outside directors.
Feir, 332 F. Supp. at 577-78; see also, e.g., Goldstein v. Alodex Corp., 409 F. Supp. 1201, 1203
n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (reasoning that a management director would have more extensive
knowledge of the facts than a non-management director, and “each must undertake that
investigation which a reasonable prudent man in that position would conduct”).
80
See supra note 12 (quoting Rule 10b-5); infra Part V.B.
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violation must involve an “instrumentality of interstate commerce[.]”81
This element is satisfied when a corporation’s security is traded over the
national securities exchanges, because such trading necessarily involves
the use of interstate commerce—telephone, email, or posted mail.
Second, the violation must be “in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.”82 This element is construed broadly. Third, the required
disclosure must contain a false or misleading statement (an actionable
misrepresentation) or must omit certain material information required to
make included information not misleading (an omission).83 Fourth, the
element of deception may be met when a director allows a false
disclosure to be issued.84 Federal courts have held that scienter for
federal securities law claims includes willfulness, intentionality, severe
recklessness, and extreme departures from the standard of care.85
Direct SEC claims under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are often
accompanied by claims that the defendants violated Section 13(a) of the
Exchange Act, along with Rules 13a-1 and 12b-20,86 Sections 13(b)(2)(A),
13(b)(2)(B),87 and 13(b)(5), Rule 13b2-1, Rule 13b2-2, and Section 17(a) of
the Securities Act. These statute sections and regulations deal with
annual report filings and fraud in connection with the offer or sale of a
security. These sections do not require that the SEC prove scienter.
Furthermore, liability for failure to maintain adequate internal
accounting controls and financial recordkeeping may arise under the
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007).
Id.
83
See Carl W. Mills, Note, Breach of Fiduciary Duty as Securities Fraud: SEC v. Chancellor
Corp., 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 439, 478 (2005).
84
See Mills, supra note 83, at 480.
85
See Ernst and Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197-99 (1976); Fairfax, supra note 25, at
n.263; see also Mills, supra note 83, at 480-81.
86
See supra note 12 (quoting Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5); 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (2000); 17
C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-1, 240.12b-20 (2007); see also supra note 11 and accompanying text (citing
in part and quoting in part Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Section 305(b), which incorporates wrongs
under Section 10(b)); In re Michael Marchese, No. 34-47732, 2003 WL 1940244, at *5 (Apr.
24, 2003) (citing several cases holding that scienter is not required to show a violation of
Sections 13(a)-(b) of the Exchange Act or of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act).
87
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2)(A)-(B) (2000); supra note 86 (discussing the application of
Marchese).
Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act requires every reporting
company to make and keep books, records and accounts that
accurately and fairly reflect the issuer’s transactions.
Section
13(b)(2)(B) requires a company to devise and maintain a system of
internal controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that
transactions are recorded as necessary to permit the preparation of
financial statements in conformity with GAAP.
Marchese, 2003 WL 1940244, at *5.
81
82
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securities laws.88 The issue of whether or not the defendant acted with
the requisite scienter under Section 10(b) usually bears the closest
scrutiny.
In the archetypal scenario, one or more senior officers participate in
the accounting fraud by recording false numbers in accounting records,
“making up” accounting methods not in conformance with generally
accepted (or other legitimate) accounting principles or creating false
purchase orders and bank records.89 Also, one or more such officers
issue false and misleading press releases regarding the corporation’s
earnings or revenues.90 This behavior is deliberate fraud in violation of
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5—the defendants willfully made
misrepresentations to the public regarding the corporation’s securities.
Moreover, the officers in this scenario file the false information with the
SEC in required quarterly and annual financial reports, violating not
only Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, but also statutes and regulations
requiring the filing of accurate and truthful information in reports
required by the SEC.91 To make matters worse, chief executive officers
and chief financial officers of the offending entities (or those individuals
filling those positions) violate SOA Section 301’s certification provision
by signing the filings and certifying that the filings are accurate and
truthful.92
The issue under federal law is whether “a sustained or systematic
failure of the board to exercise oversight[]” demonstrates the requisite
In addition, there may be a claim that the defendants aided and abetted violations of
the above provisions or caused violations of the above provisions.
89
See, e.g., SEC v. Elsie M. Leung, No. 19558, 2006 WL 305789, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 8,
2006) (where Gemstar-TV Guide International, Inc.’s chief financial officer “directed and
approved” fraudulent revenue reporting and lied to auditors about how certain
transactions were structured); SEC v. Umesh Malhotra et al., No. 18162, No. 1:03CV00211
(May 30, 2003) (alleging that senior officers engaged in accounting tricks to defraud
investors); SEC v. Eagle Bldg. Tech., Inc. and Anthony Damato, No. 17803, 2002 WL
31386094 (D.D.C. Oct. 23, 2002) (case in which former president and chief executive officer
of Eagle Building Technologies, Inc. falsified purchase orders and bank documents so as to
inflate the company’s revenues).
90
See, e.g., SEC v. Maxxon et al., No. 19132, 2005 WL 597023 (D.N.D. Mar. 14, 2005)
(President of company made false and misleading statements about company’s main
product); Damato, 2002 WL 31386094; supra note 81.
91
See, e.g., Damato, 2002 WL 31386094 (where former president and chief executive
officer Damato falsified accounting data reported to the public in annual and quarterly
reports filed with the SEC); see supra notes 81-82; supra note 12 (quoting the texts of Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5). See generally notes 78-79 and accompanying text (citing an array of
statutes and regulations regarding truthful submissions to the SEC).
92
See, e.g., SEC v. Cedric Kushner Promotions, Inc. et al., No. 19485, 2005 WL 3304009
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2005).
88
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level of scienter.93 Federal courts have found that egregious disregard
for internal controls and monitoring suffices to establish scienter.94 Thus,
an extreme departure from reasonable monitoring and oversight may
suffice for liability under federal law, even if such departure does not
amount to a willful departure from due care.95
Additional claims may arise from the above-described scheme to
defraud. For example, the fact that records can easily be falsified may
indicate that management directors failed to put internal controls in
place, failed to devise effective internal controls, or utterly disregarded
internal controls that were in place.96 These monitoring lapses violate
SOA Section 404 and play into the determination that management acted
with intent to defraud. A reasonable inference is that management failed
to create or use internal controls in order to avoid leaving a paper trail
and to make the fraud more difficult for outside auditors, the SEC, and
other watchdogs to detect.97
One scheme involves attempts to create new accounting
methodologies that stretch the limits of accounting principles, followed
by the senior executives’ refusals to correct errors created by the

In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996). see supra
text accompanying note 60.
94
Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971; see supra note 77 and accompanying text (explaining the
scienter requirement under securities regulation suits in federal court).
95
See supra note 77 and accompanying text. A trend may exist in state courts to hold
directors liable for failure to respond to red flags generated by internal control systems,
even when those red flags were not directly in front of the board. See Burch, supra note 65,
at 496-97. However, directors like Marchese and Peselman were aware of red flags, but
took no steps to respond to those red flags. See generally In re Michael Marchese, No. 3447732, 2003 WL 1940244 (Apr. 24, 2003); SEC v. Chancellor Corp., No. 1:03-CV-10762, 2003
WL 23885225 (D. Mass. Apr. 24, 2003). Their behavior likely should suffice to establish
liability in state court, unless those effects are mitigated by exculpatory provisions and
directors’ and officers’ indemnification insurance.
96
See, e.g., SEC v. Solucorp Indus. Ltd., 274 F. Supp. 2d. 379, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding
that the president and the chief financial officer of the company “either circumvented or
failed to implement” internal accounting controls for the corporation); SEC v. CIBC Mellon
Trust Co., No. 19081, 2005 WL 372505, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2005) (noting the allegation
that CIBC Mellon “fail[ed] to have sufficient policies, procedures[,] and internal controls in
place” and thus did not detect bribery and illegal conduct by certain of its officers and
directors); SEC v. Dale Peterson et al., No. 17439, 2002 WL 461337, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 27,
2002) (alleging that the CEO remarked he was “sick of people thinking Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles was important” and that orders to disregard GAAP came from the
top).
97
Similarly, market timing schemes, whereby trades are executed at an earlier or later
time instead of on the day the order was received, may indicate internal controls that are
too easily thwarted. See, e.g., Cedric Kushner Promotions, 2005 WL 3304009.
93
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seriously flawed methodology.98 The size of the error, the length of time
the error stood uncorrected, management’s refusal to correct the error
despite an outside auditor’s advice to do so, and attempts to hide the
error from accountants are factors indicating management’s attempts to
defraud the investing public. For example, in one company, Waste
Management, Inc., the error stood uncorrected for two years and
exceeded $100 million.99 Moreover, Waste Management executives
“concealed [the error] from the Company’s outside auditors.”100 Failure
to correct the errors amounted to failure to monitor and respond to red
flags and demonstrated that management acted with scienter.101
In several cases against management directors, these directors
manipulated accounts to inflate revenues, filed false reports with the
SEC, and profited by engaging in classical insider trading. However,
failure to monitor might violate Section 10(b)’s antifraud provision, even
in the absence of these activities. Also, liability under Sections 10(b) and
17(a)(2) may arise in the context of offering statements if directors
affirmatively state in a prospectus that they have met their state law
monitoring duties.
If the prospectus contains such affirmative
representations, then those representations set the standard by which the
SEC can measure the directors’ managerial performance.102 Moreover,
liability may arise if the directors totally abdicated responsibility and the
statements fail to disclose that the directors were deficient in meeting
their state law monitoring duties.103 Additionally, even though liability
under Section 10(b) arises only if the defendant was under a duty to
speak, under both federal and state law, an affirmative false statement by
management creates a duty to correct the misrepresentation.
B. Unfitness to Serve Based on Failure to Monitor and Investigate
A determination that a management director is unfit to serve is an
interim step after the determination that the director has violated either
98
See, e.g., SEC v. Deal L. Buntrock, et al., No. 18913, 2004 WL 2192396, at *1 (Sept. 30,
2004) (where senior executives failed to correct errors created by Waste Management’s vice
president of finance’s new—but fatally flawed—accounting methodology, despite being
put on notice that the methodology overstated income).
99
See id.
100
Id.
101
Id. Even if the defendants initially were not dishonest, at some point during the two
year period in which the directors let the error stand, the executives’ behavior was
fraudulent—probably at or before the point they determined to conceal the error from
Waste Management’s outside auditors.
102
In re Franchard Corporation, No. 4710, 1964 WL 67454, at *9 (July 31, 1964).
103
Id.
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Section 10(b) or Section 17(a)(2), and prior to the determination that the
director should be barred from serving as an officer or director of a
public corporation. Prior to SOA, the SEC could seek a bar order only in
federal district court and only on a showing of “substantial unfitness[.]”
A six-factor test used to determine “substantial unfitness[]” was
developed in SEC v. Patel:
(1) the ‘egregiousness’ of the underlying securities law
violation;
(2) the defendant’s ‘repeat offender’ status;
(3) the defendant’s ‘role’ or position when he engaged in
the fraud;
(4) the defendant’s degree of scienter;
(5) the defendant’s economic stake in the violation; and
(6) the likelihood that misconduct will recur.104
After Patel and SOA’s enactment, some courts have used a slightly
modified version of the Patel test to determine unfitness, while others
have adopted additional factors, including:
the nature and complexity of the scheme; . . . the use of
corporate resources [company time or resources] in
executing the scheme; . . . the loss to investors and others
as a result of the scheme; . . . the defendant’s use of
stealth and concealment; [] the defendant’s history of
business and related misconduct; and [] the defendant’s
acknowledgement of wrongdoing and the credibility of
his contrition.105
It is clear that Congress intended to lower the standard for measuring
unfitness. Since the finding is based on a balancing test, unfitness may
occur if one factor is particularly egregious or if several factors are
implicated. Moreover, courts generally take a holistic approach in
evaluating whether the defendant’s conduct demonstrates unfitness, and
SEC complaints and litigation releases generally specify misconduct
along the same lines.106
Under the current SEC and federal court approaches, “sustained and
systematic” failures to monitor and investigate red flags may lead to a
104
105

SEC v. Patel, 61 F.3d 137, 141 (2d Cir. 1995).
SEC v. Levine, 517 F. Supp. 2d 121, 145 (D.D.C. 2007) (citing Barnard, supra note 78, at

46).
106

See id. (stating that the factors cited are neither exhaustive nor mandatory).
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determination that the defendant is unfit to serve. For example, the
accounting fraud in Waste Management’s case was based on a complex
accounting methodology where corporate personnel executed the fraud,
losses exceeded $100 million, and the defendants concealed material
information from outside auditors. Also, the defendants’ conduct in that
case demonstrated unfitness under the pre-SOA test. The defendants’
behavior was egregious over the course of two years, and senior
executives knowingly executed the fraud.
To determine the likelihood of future misconduct, courts consider
past misconduct, lack of contrition, and acknowledgement of
wrongdoing. For example, a senior officer who denied that he had
engaged in fraud, despite strong evidence to the contrary, and who
insisted that the SEC brought fraud charges because it was out to get
him, was found unfit to serve. As another example, first-time offenders,
who became involved with public companies after a jury verdict of
fraud, were found unfit to serve “notwithstanding their status as firsttime offenders[;]”107 their conduct demonstrated “a spectre of [future]
misconduct.”108
C. The Bar Remedy for Failure to Monitor and Investigate
In determining whether the remedies should include a temporary or
permanent bar, courts use factors such as the impact and severity of the
fraud, the prior history of misconduct, and acknowledgement of
wrongdoing to determine whether a temporary or permanent ban is an
appropriate remedy. While past violations are “not essential” for
imposing a lifetime ban, “it is essential, in the absence of such violations,
that a district court articulate the factual basis for a finding of the
likelihood of recurrence.”109 Moreover, courts consider whether a
conditional or limited bar is sufficient, especially where there is no prior
history of unfitness, but other factors may outweigh the lack of prior
history of business misconduct.110 For example, a defendant’s continued
refusal to admit wrongdoing in the face of evidence otherwise, combined
with violation of a preliminary injunction, weighs in favor of a decadeslong or a permanent ban.111 Further, a base of operations in another
country, with a record of violations in the other country, but no violation
Levine, 517 F. Supp. 2d at 146-47 (imposing a ten-year ban in light of defendants’ lack
of prior unfitness).
108
Id. at 146.
109
Patel, 61 F.3d at 142; see Levine, 517 F. Supp. 2d at 146-47.
110
Patel, 61 F.3d at 142.
111
SEC v. Robinson, No. 00 Civ. 7452, 2002 WL 1552049, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2002).
107
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of a preliminary injunction in the U.S., weighs against a permanent ban
and in favor of a twenty-year ban.112 Accounting fraud, combined with
public misrepresentations and failure to implement internal controls,
weigh in favor of a permanent ban.
IV. BARS AGAINST NON-MANAGEMENT DIRECTORS FOR FAILURE TO
MONITOR AND INVESTIGATE
Despite the unique role of non-management directors as corporate
securities monitors, liability rarely exists if they fail to fulfill that
function.113 And yet, non-management directors do fail, as evidenced by
reports about the role of the board and non-management directors in
Enron, WorldCom, and Waste Management.
Non-management
directors have some responsibility for internal controls; if no controls are
in place or there is a systematic failure, even non-management directors
should be aware of the failure and take steps to correct the problem.
Further, non-management directors may be just as liable under Sections
10(b) and 17(a)(2) as management directors. If non-management
directors turn a blind eye to red flags, their culpability should be
analyzed under the same scheme as if a management director engaged in
that conduct.
To bar non-management directors, the three levels of analysis
described in Part III.A would apply, but the offending conduct likely will
be different from the management director conduct that violates the rule.
This Part discusses the offending conduct, the unfitness factors, and the
bar order.
A. Non-Management Directors’ Failure to Monitor May Amount to Securities
Fraud
While complaints against management directors generally stem from
actual falsification of accounting records, false press releases, or
misrepresentations in SEC filings, complaints against non-management
directors more often arise from non-management directors’ awareness of
and failure to prevent management directors’ accounting fraud. This
112
SEC v. Save the World Air, Inc., 2005 WL 3077514, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2005)
(holding that although defendant continued to protest innocence, despite evidence that he
must have known of misrepresentations, defendant should be subject to a limited 20-year
ban, and not a lifetime ban, even though a lifetime ban would not be an abuse of
discretion). Perhaps the court was thinking he should be just Australia’s problem. Prior to
this case, he was cited in Australia for selling unregistered securities.
113
See generally Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins & Michael Klausner, Outside Director
Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055 (2006).
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behavior may violate Sections 10(b), 13, and 404. Four recent cases
illustrate securities laws claims based on non-management failure to
monitor.
1.

The Chancellor case

Compared to the massive frauds and accounting restatements at
Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, and Tyco, among others, in which
equity, revenues, and assets were restated by hundreds of millions, if not
billions of dollars, pension plans evaporated overnight, and thousands of
employees became jobless, the alleged fraud at Chancellor was minor.114
But viewed in light of SEC enforcement trends, the case may have
significant impact on corporate director behavior. The case brought by
the SEC against Chancellor is notable because the SEC sought to hold
Rudolph Peselman, a non-management director and audit committee
member, liable for securities fraud for “recklessly sign[ing] a number of
financial statements that were materially misleading” and for taking “no
care to ensure their accuracy.”115 Also, the SEC sought permanently to
ban Peselman from serving as an officer or director of any publicly
traded company. The allegations against Michael Marchese, a nonmanagement director and member of the audit committee, were
essentially the same, but the SEC brought an administrative proceeding
against him, seeking a cease and desist order. This difference in the type
of proceeding may be due to the fact that Marchese filed a letter with the
SEC expressing concerns with Chancellor’s financial reporting.
In April of 2003, the SEC filed its civil complaint against Chancellor
and its senior officers (a non-management director, Peselman; Metcalf
Davis, Chancellor’s independent auditor; and Gregory Davis,
Chancellor’s audit engagement partner). In a related matter, the SEC
filed an administrative proceeding against Michael Marchese.116 The
SEC alleged that Chancellor’s Chief Executive Officer, Brian Adley,
orchestrated an accounting fraud to overstate Chancellor’s revenue by
improperly consolidating revenue from MRB, Inc. (“MRB”), a newly

Compare supra notes 6-7, 9-10 and accompanying text, with supra note 26 and
accompanying text. For example, the literature dealing solely with Enron as a case study in
business and legal ethics is voluminous compared to the handful of articles that discuss the
Chancellor case.
115
SEC v. Chancellor Corp., No. 03 Civ. 10762, 2003 WL 23885225, at ¶ 5 (D. Mass. 2003).
116
In re Michael Marchese, No. 34-47732, 2003 WL 1940244 (Apr. 24, 2003); see supra notes
78-79.
114
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acquired subsidiary, prior to the acquisition’s closing.117 Further, the
complaint alleged that Adley improperly caused Chancellor to report
fees paid to Vestex, an entity that Adley controlled, for services
purportedly rendered by Vestex to Chancellor in connection with the
acquisition of the subsidiary.118 The SEC alleged that few, if any, services
were rendered in exchange for the reported fees.119 Moreover, the SEC
alleged that Adley directed the fees to be capitalized as an asset of
Chancellor, instead of properly reporting the fees as an expense.120 As a
result of this scheme, Chancellor overstated its 1998 revenue by 177%, its
net income by $850,000, and its assets by $3.3 million.121
In early 1999, Chancellor’s outside auditors, Reznick Fedder,
informed the management directors that it was improper to consolidate
MRB’s revenues unless Chancellor had control over MRB’s operations
prior to the closing. Senior management reacted by delivering to
Reznick Fedder documents demonstrating effective control of MRB.122
However, Reznick Fedder was not convinced that Chancellor’s socalled control over MRB’s affairs justified consolidating MRB’s and
Chancellor’s financial statements.123 Reznick Fedder provided to senior
management accounting literature that outlined the standards to be met
for proper consolidation.124 Senior management then provided to
Reznick Fedder amended documents that purported to show that
Chancellor exercised the requisite control over MRB’s day-to-day
operations and financial decision-making according to the criteria
discussed in the accounting literature provided by Reznick Fedder.125
When Reznick Fedder refused to change its position and issue an
unqualified audit opinion,126 Chancellor’s senior management fired
117
Chancellor, 2003 WL 23885225, at ¶ 2. Chancellor began the process of acquiring MRB,
Inc. (“MRB”), a closely held Georgia corporation, on August 10, 1998. Id. at ¶ 22. Under
GAAP, the financial results of the two companies could be consolidated either as of the
closing date, or as of the time that Chancellor gained effective control over MRB. Id. at
¶ 68. The closing occurred on January 29, 1999. Id. at ¶ 22. Chancellor consolidated MRB’s
revenue in Chancellor’s 1998 financial results. Id. at ¶ 23. The Division alleged that
Chancellor gained effective control over MRB as of the 1999 closing date, and not prior to
the closing date. Id. at ¶ 24.
118
Id. at ¶ 33.
119
Id. at ¶ 8.
120
Id. at ¶¶ 12-14.
121
Id.
122
Id. at ¶ 24.
123
Id. at ¶ 23.
124
Id. at ¶ 25.
125
Id. at ¶ 26.
126
Id. at ¶ 28.
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Reznick Fedder, in part due to the dispute over consolidation of MRB’s
financial results.127
Chancellor then hired Metcalf Davis. Metcalf Davis issued an
unqualified audit opinion despite awareness of various red flags,
including the dispute over consolidating MRB’s results, concerns on the
part of a senior manager on the audit team over the authenticity of the
amendment, the lack of documentation of services provided by Vestex,
and knowledge that consolidation of MRB’s financial results and
capitalization of the Vestex fees would result in reporting a significantly
improved financial picture for Chancellor than would otherwise be the
case.128
After receiving notification from Reznick Fedder that it had advised
Chancellor that its accounting treatment of the MRB acquisition did not
comply with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”), the
SEC began a review of Chancellor’s 1998 annual report on Form 10-KSB
and other financial filings.129 The SEC’s complaint followed shortly after
its review of Chancellor’s filings.
The SEC alleged “Peselman was aware of the disagreement over the
consolidation date and approved the dismissal of Reznick Fedder, but
took no steps to determine whether Chancellor’s position on that issue
was incorrect.”130 According to the SEC, Peselman should have asked
why Metcalf Davis approved the 1998 consolidation, “even though that
approval was completely contrary to Reznick Fedder’s position on the
issue.”131 Further, the SEC complaint alleged that Peselman, among
others, knew of red flags related to the MRB acquisition and fees paid for
services performed by Vestex, yet signed Chancellor’s annual report for
fiscal year 1998 “without taking any steps to ensure that it did not
contain materially misleading statements.”132
The complaint charged Peselman with “engag[ing] in fraudulent
activities resulting in material overstatements of revenue, income, and
Id. Chancellor Corporation informed the SEC that Reznick Fedder had approved the
filings. Id. at ¶¶ 40-42.
128
Id. at ¶ 72.
129
Id. at ¶ 43.
130
Id. at ¶ 29. The complaint alleges that Reznick Fedder reaffirmed its position in a
memorandum sent to the audit committee, consisting of Adley and Marchese, and at a
subsequent board meeting attended by Adley, Churchill (Chancellor’s President), and
Peselman. Id. at ¶ 25.
131
Id. at ¶ 48.
132
Id.
127
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assets in Chancellor’s public announcements and in its filings with the
Commission[] . . . in violation of Section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act . . . and Rule 10b-5 . . . .”133 Further, the complaint charged Peselman
with aiding and abetting Chancellor’s reporting of false and misleading
statements in the annual report in violation of Section 13(a) of the
Exchange Act and Rules 12b-20 and 13a-1.134 Moreover, the complaint
charged that Peselman “knew, or was reckless in not knowing,” that
Chancellor maintained false and misleading books and records, and that
Peselman “knowingly and substantially assisted Chancellor to keep and
maintain false and misleading books and records” for its 1998 and 1999
fiscal years and associated fiscal quarters,135 in violation of Section
13(b)(2)(A)136 of the Exchange Act. Finally, the complaint charged that
Peselman aided and abetted Chancellor’s failure to devise and maintain
a system of internal controls necessary to permit the preparation of
Chancellor’s financial statements in accordance with GAAP.137
The SEC sought civil monetary penalties pursuant to Section 20(e) of
the Exchange Act and a permanent injunction prohibiting Peselman from
violating Sections 10(b), 13(a), 13(b)(2)(A), and 13(b)(2)(B) of the
Exchange Act.138 Also, the SEC sought an order permanently barring

Id. at ¶ 84-85. Also, it charged that Peselman’s conduct “involved fraud, deceit, or
deliberate or reckless disregard [for] regulatory requirements, and resulted in substantial
loss, or significant risk of substantial loss, to other persons, within the meaning of Section
21(d)(3) of the Exchange Act.” Id. at ¶ 86. Section 21(d)(3) of the Exchange Act allows the
Commission to seek civil penalties up to $100,000 if “(aa) the violation . . . involved fraud,
deceit, manipulation, or deliberate or reckless disregard of a regulatory requirement; and
(bb) such violation directly or indirectly resulted in substantial losses or created a
significant risk of substantial losses to other persons.” 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d)(3)(B)(iii)(aa)(bb). A question remains as to whether such reckless disregard of regulatory requirements
constitutes a crime.
134
Chancellor, 2003 WL 23885225, at ¶ 7. Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78m(a), requires that companies trading on national securities exchanges file annual
reports. Rule 12b-20, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-20 (2007), requires that filings with the SEC be
updated with additional information so that those filings are not misleading. Rule 13a-1
requires the filing of annual reports for publicly-traded companies. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-1
(2007).
135
Chancellor, 2003 WL 23885225, at ¶ 108.
136
Id. at ¶ 109. Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act requires that publicly-traded
companies maintain records that “accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and
dispositions of the assets of the issuer[.]” 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (2000 & Supp. 2005).
137
Chancellor, 2003 WL 23885225, at ¶ 114. Again, Peselman “knew, or was reckless in
not knowing, that Chancellor’s conduct was improper[]” and “knowingly and substantially
assisted Chancellor’s failure to devise and maintain” such internal controls, in violation of
Section 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act. Id. at ¶ 115.
138
Id. at Prayer for Relief ¶ IV, ¶ 116.
133
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Peselman (among others) from serving as an officer or director of any
publicly-traded company.139
Marchese and the SEC consented to the entry of a settlement order at
the institution of the cease and desist proceedings.140 The order stated
that Marchese “failed to perform his duties as a director. He recklessly
ignored signs pointing to improper accounting treatment, thereby
allowing management’s fraud to continue. He acted recklessly in
signing Chancellor’s Form 10-KSB for 1998, which contained materially
misleading statements.”141 Furthermore, “Marchese approved the firing
[of Reznick Fedder] although he knew that it was at least partly due to
the auditors’ disagreement with Adley.”142 Moreover, in a statement that
accords even more closely with the language of due care articulated in
state court opinions, the SEC alleged that “Marchese’s dereliction of his
duty as an outside director is more broadly reflected in his complete
failure ever to review Chancellor’s accounting procedures or internal
controls, or even to become aware that he was an audit committee
member[] . . . .”143 However, as mentioned previously, possibly because
Marchese cooperated with the SEC, the SEC did not seek an order
barring Marchese from serving as an officer or director.
2.

Other post-SOA cases

In another 2003 proceeding, the SEC charged Tucker, a nonmanagement director and member of the audit committee at Candies,
Inc., with aiding and abetting violations of Sections 10(b) and 13(a). The
SEC complaint alleged that Tucker knew that Candie’s senior
management engaged in accounting fraud.144 Further, Tucker helped
Candie’s senior management obtain false documentation in support of
accounting fraud. Moreover, Tucker, as a member of the audit
committee, either knew or was reckless in not knowing, that the outside
auditors questioned a number of transactions and refused to sign off on
Id. at ¶ VI.
In re Michael Marchese, No. 34-47732, 2003 WL 1940244, at *1, *6 (Apr. 24, 2003); see
supra notes 78-79. An overwhelming number of administrative proceedings are resolved
through a consent decree, in which the defendant neither admits nor denies the SEC’s
findings of fact or conclusions of law. As is typical in these proceedings, Marchese neither
admitted nor denied the SEC’s factual findings, except as to the SEC’s jurisdiction over him
and the subject matter of the proceedings. Id. at *1 ¶ II.
141
Id. at *1-2.
142
Id.; see supra note 118 and accompanying text.
143
Marchese, 2003 WL 1940244 at *1-2.
144
SEC v. Lawrence O’Shaughnessy, Civ. Action, 03-3021, ¶¶ 97-98 (S.D.N.Y. 2003),
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp18120a.htm.
139
140

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol42/iss4/2

Burch: "Unfit to Serve" Post-Enron

2008]

"Unfit to Serve" Post Enron

1111

the financial statements. Tucker agreed to a five-year ban as part of his
settlement with the SEC.
In a 2004 proceeding, the SEC charged Del Global, its senior officers,
and the Chair of Del Global’s Audit Committee with a three-year
financial fraud involving improper accounting for an acquisition by Del
Global, among other matters.145 The complaint alleged that the audit
committee chair, at the request of the chief financial officer and in order
to satisfy concerns raised by outside auditors who questioned the
transaction, falsely confirmed that his audit firm had performed
accounting work related to the acquisition. The audit committee chair’s
conduct violated books and records provisions, internal controls
provisions, and lying-to-auditors provisions.
In another 2004 proceeding, the SEC instituted cease and desist
proceedings against Ture Roland Fahlin, a non-management director
and member of the supervisory board of a Swiss company trading on the
New York Stock Exchange, for improper accounting for a joint
venture.146 Fahlin signed a letter stating that Ahold had control over the
joint venture for purposes of consolidating its financial results with those
of the joint venture and then rescinded the letter but failed to inform the
outside auditors that the letter was rescinded. The SEC charged that,
“[a]s a result of Fahlin’s failure to fulfill his duties described above as a
member of Ahold’s supervisory board and audit committee, Fahlin was
a cause of Ahold’s violation of Sections 13(b)(2)(A) and 13(b)(2)(B) of the
Exchange Act.”147 However, the SEC did not seek penalties other than a
cease and desist order, at the request of the Dutch Public Prosecutor’s
Office, which was conducting a parallel criminal investigation and
sought to avoid potential double-jeopardy issues.
3.

Pre-SOA cases

Prior to the early 1970’s and the failure of Penn Central Company,
the SEC’s involvement in issues of director oversight was fairly
passive.148 While the SEC did fault non-management directors for failure
to monitor, until recently and after SOA, it had not sought bar orders
against non-management directors. However, over the intervening
145
SEC v. Del Global Tech. Corp., Civ. Action, 04-4092 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp18732.pdf.
146
In re Ture Roland Fahlin, http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-50519.htm (last
visited Feb. 22, 2008).
147
Id. at § 3.
148
H. LOWELL BROWN, BRIBERY IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE § 8.7 (2003).
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years, the SEC has addressed the obligations of non-management
directors where the company’s violations involved possible securities
fraud and where a company’s violations do not constitute fraud.149
In 1975, certain senior officers and employees of Stirling Homex
engaged in a fraudulent scheme “to show continually increasing sales
and earnings[]” by recording “fictitious sales, earnings, and assets.”150
Stirling Homex filed with the SEC and distributed to its shareholders
“materially false and misleading registration statements, press releases,
annual and periodic reports[,] and other materials . . . .”151 The directors,
who were financially sophisticated, questioned the senior officers about
certain financial information that indicated an ongoing liquidity problem
at the corporation.152 The directors accepted superficial answers and
failed to follow-up on requests for financial information that (as it turned
out) was never provided.153 The SEC faulted the directors because:
Neither . . . [of the directors] were informed nor realized
that the company was suffering serious operating and
financial difficulties[,] and they made no greater effort to
involve themselves in the company’s affairs in 1971 or
early 1972. Instead, on this and other occasions, they
relied on the self-serving representations of Stirling
Homex management and actions by the company’s
accountants, bankers, and investment counsel which
they perceived to be favorable.154
The SEC labeled the directors’ job performance “not adequate[]” because
their presence on the board did not “have the impact upon the
company’s operations which shareholders and others might reasonably
have expected.”155
More recently, in 1994, the SEC charged Cooper Corporation, its
former chief executive officer, and former chief operating officer with

149
E.g., In re W. R. Grace & Co., No. 39157, 1997 WL 597984, at *1, n.4 (Sept. 30, 1997)
(reporting investigation into the conduct of certain officers and directors, particularly nonmanagement directors).
150
In re Stirling Homex Corp., No. 11516, 1975 WL 163038, at *1 (July 2, 1975) (report of
investigation relating to activities of the board of directors).
151
Id.
152
See generally id.
153
Id.
154
Id. at *4.
155
Id. at *5, *6.
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fraudulent schemes involving frontrunning156 and market manipulation
of bonds, seeking an injunction against the corporation and its former
chiefs.157 The board of directors took no action to remove the senior
officers from their management positions from which they could
effectuate the fraudulent schemes, even after the board was informed
that the officers were indicted and were not cooperating with
independent legal counsel hired by the board.158 Furthermore, the board
took no steps to reclaim from the officers certain profits that the officers
had obtained due to conflict of interest transactions that were unknown
to the board at the time of the transaction, but that should have been
disclosed to the board under the corporation’s policies.159 Moreover, the
board allowed the senior officers to continue to operate the corporation
and to issue a misleading press release that the company was reviewing
the SEC’s allegations and was unaware of any wrongdoing by the senior
officers. This was despite the fact that the board was aware that the
officers were under investigation and that the officers refused to
cooperate with the board’s own legal counsel. As a result of the
misleading press release, the corporation was charged with violating
Sections 10(b) and 13(a) of the Exchange Act.
The SEC faulted the board for not moving “aggressively to fulfill
their responsibilities to oversee the conduct and performance of
management and to ensure that the company’s public statements [were]
candid and complete.”160 According to the SEC, “potential violations of
the federal securities laws involving self-dealing and fraud by
management [were] called to the attention of the board of directors” and
the board “failed to take immediate and decisive corrective action on
these matters and . . . appeared to prefer management’s interest in
keeping the facts secret over the investors’ interest in full, fair and
accurate disclosure under the federal securities laws.”161
In Franchard, the SEC Division of Corporate Finance (the “Division”)
brought stop order proceedings to suspend the effectiveness of

156
An illegal front-run occurs when traders are alerted to large impending buy or sell
orders and then profit by using this inside information to enter the market ahead of the
large order.
157
These activities also resulted in the senior officers’ criminal indictments and
convictions under the mail and wire fraud statutes, RICO, the Investment Advisors Act,
andothers.
158
In re Stirling Homex Corp., No. 11516, 1975 WL 163038, at *1 (July 2, 1975).
159
Id.
160
Id.
161
Id.
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registration statements pertaining to Franchard Corporation (formerly
Glickman Corporation).162 The Division argued that the registration
statement inadequately disclosed pledges of control stock and the
transfer of corporate assets by Louis Glickman, the controlling
shareholder, to a business separately owned by him, called Venada.163
Further, the registration statement insufficiently disclosed whether the
board had adequately performed its oversight functions.164 The directors
were informed of the secret asset withdrawals and hired outside counsel
to investigate Glickman’s liability for the withdrawals.165 Although
Glickman promised to pay back the money with interest and to cease
making withdrawals, he repaid the loans with interest but continued to
make improper withdrawals from Glickman Corporation.166
The SEC agreed with the Division that the prospectuses were
deficient because they failed to disclose Glickman’s transfers of funds to
Venada and his pledges of his control stock in Glickman Corporation.167
Outside counsel found that Glickman Corporation’s inadequate
administrative procedures had to some extent facilitated the CEO’s
secret activities.168 Nonetheless, the SEC expressed reluctance to hold the
directors liable for failure to do reasonable due diligence to ensure that
the financial statements were correct, for failure to establish effective
procedures for monitoring and overseeing the corporation, and for
failure to disclose the above secretive acts.169

In re Franchard Corporation, No. 4710, 1964 WL 67454, at *9 (July 31, 1964).
Id. at *1.
164
Id. at *8.
165
Id. at *3.
166
Id.
167
Id. The SEC addressed why disclosure of Glickman’s transactions was required in the
registration statement. Although some of the facts went to Glickman’s personal real estate
ventures, the SEC asserted that these facts were material facts and should have been
disclosed for the following reasons. Id. at *6. First, the withdrawals were significant
withdrawals of cash when measured against Glickman Corporation stockholders’ equity
and cash flow. Id. at *7. Second, the withdrawals implicated Glickman’s “managerial
ability and personal integrity.” Id. at *6. Third, the offering of stock in Glickman
Corporation was made primarily based on “[Louis] Glickman’s name and reputation as a
successful real estate investor and operator[;]” thus, investors were being offered an
opportunity to buy Glickman’s unique managerial expertise. Id. The secret transfer of
funds just after the filing of the registration statement, from Glickman Corporation to
Venada and Louis Glickman’s pledges of his interest in Glickman Corporation stock
indicated, Glickman’s “strained financial position and his urgent need for cash in his
personal real estate ventures[,]” facts that would be material to an evaluation of Glickman’s
ability to manage Glickman Corporation. Id.
168
In re Franchard Corporation, No. 4710, 1964 WL 67454, at *8 (July 31, 1964).
169
Id.
162
163
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The Division argued that the directors made an implied statement
that they properly managed the affairs of the corporation because the
directors’ names were listed in the prospectus.170 Also, the Division
argued that the directors did not meet the implied standard of behavior
because the board did not exercise judgment independent from
Glickman’s influence.171 However, the SEC disagreed with the Division
because the prospectuses “contained no affirmative representations
concerning the participation of the directors in [Glickman Corporation’s]
affairs.”172 The Glickman Corporation prospectuses did not speak to the
level of the directors’ management responsibility, merely because the
directors’ names were listed as directors. Likewise, the board met
regularly and was informed by Glickman about the registration
statements.173 The directors had not made an affirmative statement
regarding their duties, nor had they totally abdicated their
responsibilities, according to outside counsel.174
In other early cases involving non-disclosure of material
information, but not accounting fraud, the SEC described a nonmanagement director’s obligation to ensure that information
disseminated by corporate managers paints an accurate picture of the
financial health of the company.175 For example, Gould, Inc., failed to
disclose, in its filings with the SEC, certain conflict-of-interest
transactions between Gould and some of the members of Gould’s
management. The board of directors later learned of the interested
transactions and approved them. In its report of the investigation, the
SEC faulted the board for approving the transactions without further

Id.
Id. The Division argued that the board was in fact a “nullity”—the directors “agreed
to Glickman’s proposals, derived their information as to the current state of [Glickman
Corporation’s] finances from Glickman’s sporadic oral reports, and permitted him to fix
each officer’s area of responsibility.” Id.
172
If the SEC were referring to broad statements that directors’ had met their duty, then
after Franchard, corporations would be on notice to avoid broad statements regarding
managerial performance in filings with the SEC. Rather, a better view is that the SEC was
referring to narrow statements regarding specific transactions in which board approval is
required, such as fundamental corporate changes involving board interested transactions.
In these situations, the SEC filing often refers to the procedure by which the board made its
decision related to the transaction.
173
Further, investors were aware that Glickman controlled the corporation and thus were
on notice that he might hold sway over the board of directors.
174
Id.
175
E.g., In re National Telephone Co., Inc., No. 34-14380, 1978 WL 171339 (Jan. 16, 1978);
In re Gould Inc., No. 34-13612, 1977 WL 175761 (June 9, 1977).
170
171
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inquiry from anyone other than those with a material interest in the
approval.176
In another instance, the SEC investigated a misleading filing by
National Telephone Co.177 The SEC alleged that the board of directors
was aware that the corporation was in serious financial trouble, that
management resisted making “full and fair disclosure[,]” and that
“events central to the survival of the company” were involved.178 Under
these circumstances, the SEC cautioned that, while non-management
directors need not ensure every line of a press release is accurate, nonmanagement directors do have an obligation to ensure that press releases
and reports to shareholders truthfully and fairly represent the financial
health of a corporation.
More recently, in 1997, the SEC investigated W.R. Grace & Co. along
with certain officers and directors for violation of the proxy disclosure
rules.179 Two non-management directors were aware of the information
that was required to be disclosed; both reviewed the relevant
documents.180 The SEC concluded “that [the directors] did not fulfill
their obligations under the federal securities laws[]” because “each
assumed, without taking the steps necessary to confirm their
assumptions, that [W.R. Grace’s] procedures would produce drafts of
disclosure documents describing all matters that required disclosure.”181
Further, “[e]ach also assumed, without taking steps necessary to confirm
their assumptions, that other corporate officers, including counsel, had
conducted full and informed reviews of the drafts.”182 According to the
SEC, “each had a responsibility to go beyond the established procedures
to inquire into the reasons for non-disclosure of information of which
they were aware.”183
The above cases illustrate that the SEC has advised corporate
directors of their responsibilities and roles in the context of overseeing
the operation of corporations and the production of accurate
communications to the SEC and the investing public about the financial
health of corporations. However, the SEC has been unwilling to use the

176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
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See generally Gould, 1977 WL 175761.
In Re National Telephone Company, 1978 WL 171339.
Id. at *4.
See generally In re W. R. Grace & Co., No. 39157, 1997 WL 597984 (Sept. 30, 1997).
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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full array of tools at its disposal to sanction non-management directors.
Indeed, the Chancellor, Candie’s, Del Global, and Fahlin cases demonstrate
the limits of the SEC’s recent use of its formidable array of sanctions to
counter the most egregious lapses in directorial oversight.
B. When are Non-Management Directors Unfit to Serve?
The factors used to determine whether a non-management director is
unfit should be the same as those used to determine whether a
management director is unfit.
For example, Peselman, Tucker,
Marchese, and Fahlin, as members of their corporations’ audit
committees, played key roles in facilitating fraud at their companies. If
they did not have actual knowledge of fraud, they should have known of
the fraud, because they reviewed financial statements and supervised
the outside auditors who made the committee aware of red flags. The
frauds were continuing, and senior management acted deliberately to
overstate earnings. Also, accounting fraud is often complex and
sophisticated. The frauds in these cases were complex, in some cases
involving accounting for revenues from acquired subsidiaries and joint
ventures and in other cases involving accounting for revenue from
numerous sales accounts. Moreover, the defendants concealed the
frauds from outside auditors. Given these facts, the non-management
directors met the test for unfitness.184
Notably, even the nonmanagement directors’ lack of knowledge of the internal affairs of the
corporation does not excuse these directors’ failures to monitor, in part
because the failure to monitor is egregious. The frauds were longstanding, and violations were clearly in front of the directors.
C. Bar Orders Are an Appropriate Remedy
Not surprisingly, courts weigh similar conduct and factors once it is
determined that the defendant is unfit. The test again is a balancing test.
Also, the issue may be whether there is a likelihood of future
misconduct. As with cases involving management directors, likelihood
should be measured by evidence of a history of past misconduct,
acknowledgement of wrongdoing, and evidence of contrition. Nonmanagement directors who inform the SEC of wrongdoing or who
cooperate with the SEC may face a temporary bar or a cease and desist
184
See Michael Dailey, Officer and Director Bars: Who is Substantially Unfit to Serve After
Sarbanes-Oxley, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 837, 852-59 (2003) (arguing for a factor analysis to
determine whether a bar order is appropriate); see also Philip F.S. Berg, Unfit to Serve:
Permanently Barring People From Serving as Officers and Directors of Publicly-Traded Companies
After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1871, 1902-04 (2003).
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order. Directors who allow fraud to continue, or who aid and abet fraud,
should face a longer bar. Further, past violations or the violation of a
preliminary injunction may also weigh in favor of a bar.
V. CHALLENGES AND POLICY ISSUES
Chancellor was touted as the first salvo in a war against accounting
fraud.185 However, for the war to be won, the SEC must succeed in the
face of several possible challenges. One set of challenges likely will stem
from the argument that Congress did not delegate to the SEC the power
to bring what some describe as state law fiduciary duty claims in
administrative proceedings or in federal court. As the SEC itself has
acknowledged, SEC review of directors’ behavior implicates separation
of powers issues.186 Therefore, a question becomes whether Congress
intended the SEC regulation of fraud to reach board oversight behavior.
Neither the legislative history of the Securities Act of 1933187 nor that of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934188 gives an express indication that
Congress intended to provide the SEC with the power to set standards of
behavior or corporate directors in the performance of their oversight of
corporate operations.
Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court established in Santa Fe v. Green
that a federal cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty does not
exist.189 In Santa Fe, the plaintiffs, holders of the seller’s stock, argued
that the merger price negotiated by the directors of the seller was unfair,
and the directors had breached their fiduciary duty by negotiating an
unfair price. The plaintiffs claimed that the inadequate price was an
attempt to defraud them of their shares and was actionable under
Section 10(b). Santa Fe can easily be distinguished from Chancellor, Del
Global, Candie’s, Fahlin, and the other failure to monitor cases that sound
in accounting fraud, misrepresentations, and Section 10(b) violations.
Despite the sound nature of these arguments distinguishing Santa Fe v.
Green, no precedent other than Santa Fe exists to guide a court.
The cause of action under federal law against the directors who fail
to monitor and oversee can be characterized as follows: the directors

185
CHI.
SUN
TIMES,
August
21,
2003,
available
at
http://www.suntimes.com/output/business/cst-fin-sec21.html.
See generally SEC v.
Chancellor Corp., No. 03 Civ. 10762, 2003 WL 23885225, at Prayer for Relief (D. Mass. 2003).
186
In re Franchard Corporation, No. 4710, 1964 WL 67454, at *8 (July 31, 1964).
187
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
188
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
189
See Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
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knowingly or at least recklessly failed to exercise management and
oversight. If they had exercised the appropriate oversight, then they
would have known or should have known of the accounting fraud. If
they knew or should have known of the accounting fraud, then they had
a federal law duty under the Exchange Act to ensure that the correct
information was disclosed in filings with the SEC. Because they did not
ensure that the correct information was disclosed in SEC filings and
press releases, they breached their obligations under the Exchange Act
and the regulations promulgated thereunder.
This Part will first examine whether the SEC has the power under
the Exchange Act to bring what some (mis)characterize essentially as a
breach of due care cause of action against non-management directors.
Although some argue that “[t]he Chancellor action and the public
comments of Messrs. Donaldson and Cutler together reflect the SEC’s
intent to target [non-management] directors for negligent activity (or
inactivity) and breaches of fiduciary duty,” this author argues that the
SEC brings action against only those who intentionally or recklessly
ignore clear warning signs, in other words, directors who knew or
should have known of fraud and took no steps to stop it.190 Second, this
Part discusses the standard of proof for the underlying violation, the
unfitness issue and whether a bar order is the appropriate remedy.
Third, this Part considers the nature of the incentives that such SEC
action would create. Fourth, the Part discusses whether the SEC is fit to
serve in this role.
A. Constitutional Challenges
Although Congress established the SEC to regulate disclosure of
corporate information and to enforce antifraud provisions, states still
retain primary responsibility for regulation of corporate governance.191
Therefore, the issue of whether the SEC has power to regulate the
internal affairs of corporations is first governed by whether Congress has
the power to delegate such power to the SEC under the Commerce

John F.X. Peloso & Ben A. Indek, Outside Directors and Red Flags, 231 N.Y. L.J. 3 (2004).
At the time of the Chancellor case, Donaldson was the SEC’s Chairman and Cutler its
Enforcement Director. Id.
191
See Mills, supra note 83, at 446. The author noted: “Congress was careful to also point
out[] . . . that the legislation was not intended to supplant state regulation of internal
corporate governance.” Id.
190
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Clause and second by whether Congress has delegated such power to
the SEC under the Exchange Act (the enabling statute).192
The courts have played a significant role in interpreting the
Exchange Act, primarily through Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence.193 The
Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that Congress has power under
the Commerce Clause to regulate the purchase and sale of securities, so
long as such purchase and sale affects interstate commerce. A more
subtle issue may be whether “the connection between a required
disclosure and an alleged fraud” stemming from mismanagement is too
attenuated to give rise to a claim under the Exchange Act’s antifraud
provisions.194
Although Congress’s role in the development of antifraud causes of
action was relatively limited prior to SOA, both the SEC and the courts
have been active in shaping jurisprudence in this area.195 The Supreme
Court, at times, has granted deference to the SEC on issues of
implementation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, although the future of
Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence is not certain.196 On the other hand, the Court
has, at times, rejected the SEC’s view of the requirements of Rule 10b-5 in
connection with insider trading lawsuits, although more recently the
Court has accepted the SEC’s views in this area.197
Moreover, and more importantly, the Court may look to how the
SEC has interpreted Rule 10b-5 in similar cases and whether Congress
has attempted to rein in the SEC.198 The SEC has concerned itself with
corporate governance and standards of director behavior as those
concepts are related to development of an efficient disclosure regime and
of well-functioning capital markets.199 Indeed, the SEC expressed
concern about the “development of disclosure standards adequate for

192
Joan M. Heminway, Rock, Paper, Scissors: Choosing the Right Vehicle for Federal Corporate
Governance Initiatives, FORDHAM J. OF CORP. & FIN. L. 225, 254-55 (2005).
193
Stephen J. Choi and A.C. Pritchard, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND ANALYSIS 20
(Foundation Press 2005).
194
See Mills, supra note 83, at 497-98.
195
Choi and Pritchard, supra note 193 at 464.
196
Contrast traditional misappropriation theories versus misappropriation theories of
insider trading under 10b-5, for example. Another example is the use of the efficient capital
markets hypothesis and fraud-on-the-market theory.
197
This may be due to a perceived need to protect the investing public, a need that was
apparently on the minds of members of Congress, as well as on the minds of the investing
public, following the recent accounting frauds.
198
See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
199
See Mills, supra note 83, at 489.
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informed appraisal of management’s ability and integrity” in In re
Franchard.200
In Franchard, the SEC considered two main factors: its own powers
under the Securities Act and practicalities of administering the Exchange
Act. The SEC distinguished directors’ due diligence in the preparation of
SEC filings (in this case a registration statement as required by Section 11
of the Securities Act) versus directors’ due care in the “ordinary
operations of business enterprises[.]”201 The SEC asserted that diligence
exercised in the former context is evaluated under federal securities law;
diligence exercised in the latter context is evaluated under state statutory
and common law of corporate fiduciary duty.202 Moreover, “[t]he
[Securities] Act does not purport[] . . . to define Federal standards of
directors’ responsibility in the ordinary operations of business
enterprises[,]” and the SEC has no power to “formulate administratively
such regulatory standards.”203 In other words, state law, not federal
securities law, determines standards of director behavior in conducting
ordinary business operations.
Furthermore, to require routine disclosures as to whether or not the
directors performed their state law fiduciary duties also would require
the SEC to determine whether an assertion that directors complied with
their state law fiduciary duties was a material truth or a material
misrepresentation. This would require the SEC to undertake its own
evaluation of whether the directors met their duty of care. Whether or
not directors have met their duties varies given the complexity and type
of business decision. Due to this complexity, courts are loathe to
interfere with directors’ business judgments and to find that the directors
should be liable for breach of due care. Similarly, the SEC was reluctant
to take on the administrative burden of determining rights and liabilities
for state law breach of fiduciary duty claims.
Although the SEC expressed reluctance to determine whether
directors acted as careful fiduciaries, it did leave the door open to make
such determinations.
Because the Court may be guided by an
administrative agency’s own interpretations of its powers, the Court may
grant deference to the SEC on this issue.

200
201
202
203

In re Franchard Corporation, No. 4710, 1964 WL 67454, at *5 (July 31, 1964).
Id. at *9.
Id. at *8.
Id. at *9.
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Congress granted the SEC’s Division of Enforcement additional
resources in SOA,204 indicating that Congress intended that the SEC take
an expanded role in enforcing federal law against accounting fraud.205
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed whether a claim by minority
shareholders alleging an inadequate price for their shares in a cash-out
merger stated a claim under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.206 The
Court stated that Section 10(b) was meant to reach manipulative and
deceptive conduct. Because the complaint did not allege a material
misrepresentation or omission in connection with the merger transaction,
the Court held that the complaint fell outside of the scope of Section
10(b). Moreover, the court cautioned that the claim that the merger
resulted in an unfair price to the minority shareholders was typically a
matter for state courts to decide and declined to extend the scope of Rule
10b-5 to cover situations where shareholders were dissatisfied with share
price, but no deceit was involved. The Court declined to take that step
absent clear congressional intent to federalize state law governing
director responsibilities.
In spite of the broad language in Santa Fe v. Green, and arguments
based on that language that there is no federal common law cause of
action for breach of fiduciary duty after Santa Fe, the principles
enunciated by the Court should not exclude federal liability if directors
fail in their duties and a violation of Section 10(b) results. It is more
precise to note that the Court stated that Congress did not intend to
regulate acts which “constitute no more than internal corporate
mismanagement[.]”207 The federal proceedings based on failure to
monitor and oversee involve fraud and knowledge of fraud; more than
internal corporate mismanagement is at issue.
Santa Fe does not address the issues raised by the Chancellor case.
Therefore, the Court once again may be called on to interpret the reach of
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. However, the Supreme Court might not
grant certiorari in such a case. The Court has had opportunities to resolve

See generally Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7504-7266, 78o-6, 78d-3, 18
U.S.C. §§ 1348-1350, 1514A, 1519-1520 (Supp. 2006).
205
SOA tracks very closely to Enron fraud, but does not create new penalties or sanctions
against failure to oversee. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
206
See Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
207
Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 478.
204
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a split among the Circuits with regard to the level of scienter required
under Rule 10b-5.208 Nonetheless, the Court has declined to do so.
B. The Burden of Proof
The burden of proof has two definitions: (1) the burden to produce
enough evidence to satisfy the fact finder of a particular fact in issue and
(2) persuading the fact finder that the alleged fact is true.209 The second
definition is sometimes known as the burden of persuasion. The SEC
bears the burden of persuasion on the underlying violation, on the
question of unfitness, and on whether a temporary or permanent bar
order is the appropriate remedy.
The standard of proof alerts the fact finder as to who bears what
proportion of the risk of a mistaken judgment—plaintiff or defendant.
Three standards of proof may apply—preponderance of the evidence,
clear and convincing evidence, and evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.
A preponderance of the evidence is the appropriate burden of
persuasion for SEC bar actions in both administrative proceedings and in
federal court actions, for at least two reasons. First, “the term
‘unfitness[]’ was intended to suggest a lower standard of proof than the
previous standard under the Remedies Act.”210 The change from the
“substantial unfitness” standard to an “unfitness” standard was
intended to lower the SEC’s burden of persuasion. Finally, the change in
standard may be seen as a message to courts to impose bars in cases of
egregious conduct and that a finding of the likelihood of future
misconduct is not the factor that should carry the most weight.
Secondly, preponderance is the standard most often imposed in civil
proceedings, in private plaintiff Section 10(b) lawsuits, and in
administrative proceedings to bar regulated professionals.

Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1090 n.5 (1991).
C. J. Cuevas, Rule 10b-5 and Burdens of Persuasion: A Preponderance is Enough, 12 CAP. U.
L. REV. 495, 510 n.92 (1983).
210
Barnard, supra note 78, at 20; see also S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 27 (2002).
The Commission has argued that the ‘substantial unfitness’ standard
for imposing bars is inordinately high, causing courts to refrain from
imposing bars even in cases of egregious misconduct. The proposed
bill rectifies this deficiency by modifying the standard governing
imposition of officer and director bars from ‘substantial unfitness’ to
‘unfitness.’
S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 27; see also supra note 11.
208
209
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C. Providing Proper Directorial Incentives
Another set of challenges arises from the practical and political
implications of such lawsuits. First, as a matter of law, directors are not
expected to know (and as a practical matter are not likely to know) the
detailed workings of a large corporation. Regulation, whether by formal
rulemaking or by reports, and administrative and civil proceedings must
not chill interested and qualified persons from serving as nonmanagement directors on corporate boards, but must provide a restraint
on less circumspect corporate behavior. Whereas the SEC may be able to
recognize reckless ignorance of accounting fraud when it sees it, nonmanagement directors may not know how much they should know
about corporate financial information and the decisions that produce
such information from raw data. Regulation should encourage corporate
boards, and especially non-management directors, to continue the best
practices catalyzed by SOA.
A growing wave of criticism of SOA provisions by corporations and
legislatures indicates a backlash against federal regulation of corporate
governance. Although SOA has always had its critics, more critics have
become more vocal. Such critics argue that SOA was an inappropriate
and inefficient response, and that SOA has harmed more than it has
served to benefit the economy. Regardless of one’s views as to the merits
of that argument, it remains true that Congress’s reaction was swift, and
that corporate officials were concerned with the potential liability
created by many of SOA’s provisions. Some officials reacted by leaving
their positions. Potential corporate directors have refused to take
directorial positions because of concerns about future liability, while
others face an increased due diligence burden in deciding whether they
would accept positions on corporate boards. Director and officer
liability insurance costs have reached a high not seen since the Delaware
Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom defined a standard of
personal liability for corporate directors that exposed directors to
liability for behavior formerly seen as meeting the legal standard of due
care. In the current atmosphere of uncertainty, additional concerns are
raised if the SEC increases its enforcement efforts against nonmanagement directors. Such concerns include whether the SEC would
exercise its prosecutorial discretion to bring administrative proceedings
and civil suits against directors who thought their behavior met the
standard of care under state law.
However, the recent cases reveal a trend toward holding directors
accountable for behavior that likely would breach state fiduciary duties

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol42/iss4/2

Burch: "Unfit to Serve" Post-Enron

2008]

"Unfit to Serve" Post Enron

1125

as well as amount to federal securities fraud. Even directors who are
unsure of what conduct satisfies state fiduciary duties (at a minimum)
and of what exemplifies best practices would know that falsifying
documents constitutes fraud. Audit committee members should realize
that they have a responsibility to investigate red flags raised by outside
auditors, under both state and federal law. Directors are not required to
know the details of daily operations (micro-monitoring) in order to avoid
liability. Further, the SEC has indicated that a hands-off approach in the
face of known red flags (under monitoring) may lead to liability.
D. Is the SEC Fit to Serve in this Watchdog Role?
One recent article noted that “Sarbanes-Oxley arguably fills the
statutory gap left by the 1933 and 1934 Acts, which may not have
provided enough of a statutory basis for the SEC to pursue directors who
breached their fiduciary duties.”211 In this regard, SOA may indicate
Congress’s intent to empower the SEC to bring administrative and civil
court proceedings to bar officers and directors from serving in such
capacities in publicly-traded companies.212
Indeed, SOA falls short of its real potential to enforce standards of
director care at the federal level. However, this shortcoming may reflect
Congress’s desire (influenced by the SEC) to defer to the SEC to curtail
accounting fraud. In the past, the SEC has expressed a reluctance to
bring actions against directors, particularly non-management directors,
for failure to monitor and investigate. However, to the extent that lack of
resources and enforcement options thwarted the SEC’s enforcement
efforts, SOA mitigates the problems to a degree. Congress gave the SEC
more resources to do its job and provided enhanced enforcement
remedies to aid the SEC in its enforcement efforts. Also, the SEC has
additional support from the enhanced monitoring function of other
watchdogs, particularly outside accounting firms. For example, outside
accounting firms uncovered and alerted the SEC to the accounting
frauds at Chancellor, Del Global, and Candie’s.213
Should the SEC prove to be an ineffective watchdog, others, such as
state courts and outside auditors, may provide more vigorous checks on
accounting fraud. Finally, some commentators have suggested that
Congress can step in and amend SOA to include a federal fiduciary duty
See Mills, supra note 83, at 486 (citing Peloso & Indek, supra note 190, at 3).
See Mills, supra note 83, at 487. In addition, the standard in Sarbanes-Oxley is
unfitness, as opposed to the substantial unfitness standard. See supra note 11.
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See Sale, supra note 21, at 1402.
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rule, should the SEC prove to be an ineffective watchdog. Of course, the
political will may be absent in Congress in any given election year, given
that a series of financial frauds and accounting meltdowns the size of
Enron, WorldCom, and Waste Management has not occurred since the
beginning of this century.
VI. CONCLUSION
Corporate governance flaws of the kind identified in this article are
not a new phenomenon.214 Recent scandals involving widespread
backdating of options for both management and non-management
directors, pretexting, and accounting fraud indicate that the monitoring
and oversight failures present at the beginning of this century still exist
and are likely as pervasive as they were at that time.215 Further, recent
federal regulation, including SOA and the stock exchange listing rules,
does not create new civil or criminal liabilities for corporate directors,
with a few exceptions.216 Chief executive officers and chief financial
officers, who are also likely to be directors, do face additional, express
requirements to certify the truth and accuracy of financial statements
filed with the SEC.217 However, various legal theories existed prior to
SOA under which corporate officers may have been found liable for
knowingly signing false financial statements.218 Furthermore, not every
corporate director must sign SEC filings. Under SOA, non-management
directors do not face express, new liability for failure to monitor and
oversee corporate activities. In that sense, SOA failed to take the step

This is not a case of “if it is not broken, do not fix it.”
Enron and WorldCom have come to epitomize financial and accounting fraud and the
lack of director perception of that fraud, in part due to director inattention. See generally
supra notes 26, 105 and accompanying text. Hewlett-Packard has become the “poster child”
to illustrate pretexting—an investigative practice involving gathering confidential
information through the use of invented stories. See House Panel Digs Deep in HP Spy Case,
WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 2006. Hewlett-Packard’s former board chair, Patricia Dunn, former
general counsel Ann Baskins, and former chief ethics officer Kevin Hunsacker resigned
after it was revealed that they had used pretexting to determine the source of a board leak
of confidential information regarding Hewlett-Packard’s long-term strategic plans. Id.
(The source was Hewlett-Pakard board member George Keyworth.) Whole Foods and the
SEC are investigating Whole Foods’s Chief Executive Officer John Mackey’s anonymous
internet postings attacking rival Wild Oats as a “bad business not worth its stock price.”
See Whole Foods CEO’s Anonymous Online Life, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 12, 2007, available at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19718742/. Whole Foods later attempted to purchase
Wild Oats. Id. In time, HP and Whole Foods’s behaviors may come to be seen as hubris,
underestimation of risk, overconfidence, or another type of cognitive bias.
216
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
217
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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See generally Fairfax, supra note 25.
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that would provide a more direct route to liability for failure to oversee
corporate operations.
Courts and the SEC “should approach the question of ‘unfitness’
guided by principle and with humility.”219 But more importantly, courts
and the SEC should recognize that accounting and financial fraud
threaten the public welfare.220 To the extent that courts have been
reluctant to impose prospective bars, they also should keep in mind that
Congress lowered the unfitness bar to facilitate “the SEC’s prevention of
individuals who have violated the securities laws from serving as
officers and directors[]” and to “reflect the President’s recommendation
that ‘CEOs or other officers who clearly abuse their power should lose
their right to serve in any corporate leadership positions.’”221 Only
egregious failure to heed red flags should give rise to civil monetary
liability in the new regime.222 Cases involving management ignorance of
“flagrant misdeeds, management self-interest[,] and repeated red
flags[]”223 provide a sound model for future SEC enforcement actions
and bar remedies.

See Barnard, supra note 78, at 13.
See Justin Toby McDonald, An Historical Perspective to the Corporate Bar Provisions of the
Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
987, 1021 (1992).
221
S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 26-27 (2002).
222
See Mills, supra note 83, at 492 (“At present[,] [federal regulators] are able to develop a
federal fiduciary duty standard on an ad hoc basis, selecting egregious cases that tend to
result in a standard that is both flexible and harsh.”).
223
See Mills, supra note 83, at 495.
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